Utah Supreme Court Cases, February 22, 2013

February 22, 2013

Recent Utah Supreme Court Cases

Vorher v. Henriod, 2013 UT 10, No. 20110737 (February 22, 2013).

Justice Parrish,

The Issue:

At issue in this case is whether Utah Code section 76-3-405(2)(b) applies to appeals from justice court convictions. Under section 405(1), “[w]here a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review . . . , the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense . . . which is more severe than the prior sentence.” UTAH CODE § 76-3-405(1). Section 76-3-405(2)(b) provides an exception to this general rule when a defendant’s sentence is based on a plea agreement. The court of appeals applied this exception to uphold the district court’s imposition of a more severe sentence on Petitioner following his appeal from justice court. We granted certiorari on the issue of “[w]hether the court of appeals erred in denying Petitioner’s request for extraordinary relief challenging the imposition of a more severe penalty following a de novo trial on appeal of his justice court guilty plea.”

Ruling:

We agree with Tooele City and hold that section 76-3-405(2)(b) applies to appeals from justice courts.

Analysis:

[O]ur holding in [Wisden v. District Court, 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984) (per curiam)] was clear—subsection (1) applies to justice courts. 694 P.2d 605, 606. Because subsection (1) applies to justice courts and subsection (2) creates an exception to subsection (1), then subsection (2) necessarily applies to appeals from justice court convictions. To conclude otherwise would require us to overrule Wisden.

At ¶. 12

Mr. Vorher has not even articulated an argument suggesting that we overrule our precedent in Wisden. Therefore, stare decisis dictates that section 76-3-405, including subsection (2)(b), applies to justice courts.

At. ¶ 13.

The fact that the Legislature added subsection (2) after we had explicitly held that section 76-3-405 applied to appeals from justice courts suggests that the Legislature intended subsection (2) to apply to justice courts as well.

At ¶ 14.

it would be unwise to hold that a sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement should limit a sentence subsequently imposed at trial after [the] defendant has withdrawn his plea. Plea bargains are entered into so that both sides may avoid the expense and uncertainty of a trial. In exchange for conserving State resources, [the] defendant usually receives a lower charge or lesser sentence. Thus, it would be anomalous to allow a defendant to keep the benefit of an agreement he repudiated while requiring the State to proceed to trial and prove its case.

At. ¶ 15 (quoting State v. Powell, 957 P.2d 595, 597 (Utah 1998)

Without a presumption of vindictiveness, a defendant seeking to establish the unconstitutionality of a harsher sentence following an appeal must demonstrate actual vindictiveness. But “courts have uniformly held that no actual vindictiveness was established by the mere fact that the defendant’s sentence exceeded that offered in a plea bargain.” [Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Propriety of Sentencing Judge’s Imposition of Harsher Sentence than Offered in Connection with Plea Bargain Rejected or Withdrawn Plea by Defendant -Federal Cases, 200 A.L.R. Fed. 591 (2005).] (emphasis added). Because Mr. Vorher has failed to articulate any evidence suggesting vindictiveness, any claim that section 76-3-405(2)(b) is unconstitutional would necessarily have been unsuccessful.

At. ¶20

Justice Durham (Concurring),

by its plain language, section 76-3-405 does not apply to appeals from justice court. The majority recognizes this fact in paragraph 12, and we recognized this fact in Wisden.

At. ¶ 25

Notwithstanding my disagreement with the majority’s statutory interpretation, I concur in the result because, as the majority explains in paragraphs 17 through 20, the harsher sentence imposed on Mr. Vorher by the district court does not violate his federal due process rights. The sentence may arguably violate his right to appeal or his due process rights under the Utah Constitution, see City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 519–20 (Utah 1990) (Durham, J., dissenting), but Mr. Vorher has not asked us to consider his state constitutional rights.

At. ¶27.