State v. Gurule, 2013 UT 58, No. 20111053
(October 1, 2013)
Justice
Parrish,
On appeal, Gurule argues that the search was unlawful because the officers did not possess reasonable suspicion that there were drugs in his vehicle when they stopped him for a minor traffic infraction. He further argues that the officers manipulated his Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) agent into requesting that they conduct a warrantless parole search of Gurule’s vehicle. Gurule argues that this search violated both his parole agreement and his state and federal constitutional rights. The State responds that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Gurule possessed illegal drugs, justifying Gurule’s detention. The State further responds that Gurule’s AP&P agent possessed reasonable suspicion that Gurule had violated his parole and therefore reasonably requested that the officers search Gurule’s truck on the agent’s behalf.
At ¶ 2.
We hold that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that Gurule was engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity. They improperly extended the duration of Gurule’s stop when they abandoned the original purpose of the stop—to investigate a minor traffic infraction—and instead undertook a prolonged investigation into Gurule’s possible drug activity. The district court therefore erred when it denied Gurule’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the officers’ improper detention and search.
At ¶ 3.
The Court outlines the factual circumstances of
the challenged search and detention.
At ¶¶ 4-19.
Gurule argues that his detention was unconstitutional under both the federal and Utah constitutions because the officers improperly extended the duration of his detention. The State argues that the extension of Gurule’s detention was permissible because the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigation into Gurule’s possible drug activity. While we conclude that the officers were justified in initially detaining Gurule for a traffic infraction and undertaking a protective frisk, we agree with Gurule that the officers unconstitutionally extended his detention when the encounter transitioned from a traffic stop to a drug investigation without reasonable suspicion.
At ¶ 21.
. . . Under the Fourth Amendment, we apply a two-part test to determine whether the duration and purpose of a detention is reasonable. Id. ¶ 12. “The first step is to determine whether the [traffic stop] was justified at its inception.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If so, we proceed to the second step, in which we “determine whether the detention following the stop was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
At ¶ 22.
. . . Gurule’s traffic infraction [failing to stay within lane] . . . provided the officers with justification for the initial stop. The officers were also justified in requesting Gurule’s driver’s license and vehicle registration, conducting a computer check, and issuing a citation. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 31, 63 P.3d 650. Because the only justification for the initial detention was a traffic infraction, however, the officers were required to “remain focused on the original purpose of the stop in the absence of reasonable suspicion justifying an expanded investigation.” Simons, 2013 UT 3, ¶ 38.
At ¶ 23.
Almost immediately after Gurule brought his truck to a stop, Officer Flores asked Gurule to exit the vehicle. While he performed a plain-view search of the area around the driver’s seat, Detective Anderson performed a protective frisk of Gurule. Gurule contends that this frisk and plain-view search were unconstitutional. We disagree.
At ¶ 24.
. . . “Due to this inherent dangerousness, courts allow officers to take certain precautions to protect themselves without having to justify their actions based on reasonable suspicion.” State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 24, 78 P.3d 590. One of these precautions is to allow officers to ask the driver and passengers to exit the vehicle during the pendency of the stop. Id. . . .
At ¶ 24.
Although an officer may order a driver from his vehicle during a traffic stop, the officer is not automatically entitled to conduct a protective search for weapons. Rather, the officer must “point[] to ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts,’ would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous.” Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 29 . . . .
At ¶ 25.
. . . Because “[t]he touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security,” Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108–09 (internal quotation marks omitted), we evaluate the propriety of Officer Flores’s frisk based on the totality of the circumstances, Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
At ¶ 26.
The Court outlines the information available to
the police at the time they performed the frisk and determines that
Under a totality of the circumstances analysis, . . . the officers observed “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts,” would lead an officer to the reasonable conclusion that Gurule was armed and dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that “the inherent dangerousness of all traffic stops . . . should be considered under the totality of the circumstances analysis.” Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 25. We hold that the officers were therefore justified in asking Gurule to exit his vehicle to perform a minimally invasive protective search before continuing on with the original purpose of the traffic stop.
At ¶¶ 27-28.
Extending the Duration of the Search?
During the pendency of a traffic stop, if officers gain reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity, they may turn their attention from the original purpose of the traffic stop to “expediently investigate [their] new suspicion.” Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 13. But “officers must diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.” State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40, ¶ 18, . . .
At ¶ 30.
The State argues in its brief that even before the officers stopped Gurule for a traffic infraction, they possessed reasonable suspicion that Gurule was involved in drug dealing. The State supports its arguments with the following facts: (1) Gurule was seen leaving the location of a reported drug exchange, (2) the license plate reported to dispatch belonged to someone involved in the drug trade, (3) Gurule was Hispanic, (4) Gurule was in Officer Flores’s “special attention folders,” and (5) Gurule was on parole. We disagree that these facts are sufficient to give rise to a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that Gurule had been, was then, or was “about to be engaged in criminal activity.” Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
At ¶ 34.
The Court rejects the State’s argument that the
anonymous phone call and Gurule’s movements upon being followed by police give
rise to reasonable suspicion of drug activity.
At ¶¶ 35-36.
Finally, even assuming that the officers possessed reasonable suspicion at the initiation of the traffic stop, that suspicion was dispelled by the officers’ protective frisk and plain view search of the vehicle. The officers saw nothing to indicate that Gurule was armed or involved in the possession or distribution of illegal drugs. Therefore, after the completion of the protective frisk and plain-view search, the officers were obliged to return their focus to the original purpose of the traffic stop. But they did not. Instead, they undertook a prolonged investigation into Gurule’s possible drug activity.
At ¶ 37.
In Arizona v. Johnson, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that “[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). In State v. Simons, we relied on Johnson in holding that an officer’s single, unrelated question to the defendant did not present an unconstitutional extension of an otherwise lawful traffic stop. 2013 UT 3, ¶ 39, 296 P.3d 721. But we cautioned “that while some unrelated questioning may be tolerated, officers must remain focused on the original purpose of the stop in the absence of reasonable suspicion justifying an expanded investigation.” Id. ¶ 38.
At ¶ 38.
Here, the officers’ actions “bespoke an utter lack of diligence in pursuing the original purpose of the traffic stop.” Id. ¶ 33 (internal quotation marks omitted). After the officers completed their protective frisk and plain-view search, they did not return to the original purpose of the stop. Instead, the officers made two calls. They first made a call to request a canine unit to assist in their drug investigation. Second, they called AP&P to describe their observations. Neither of these calls had any relation to Gurule’s traffic infraction and they did not constitute a de minimus extension of the stop. Indeed, these calls, and the officers’ subsequent search constituted the bulk of Gurule’s detention. Because the officers did not possess reasonable suspicion that Gurule was engaged in or about to engage in illegal drug activity, we hold that their search of Gurule’s vehicle was unlawful and the evidence obtained as a result should have been suppressed.
Jenkins v. Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District, 2013 UT 59, No. 20120705
(October 1, 2013)
ISSUES: Negligence, Duty of Care, Expert Witnesses
Justice Lee,
The plaintiffs in this case sued Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District (the District) after one of its water pipelines broke and damaged their home. Following discovery, the District moved for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that the plaintiff homeowners could not prevail on their negligence claim because they had failed to designate an expert to testify regarding the applicable standard of care. The district court granted that motion, and the homeowners appealed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that expert testimony was unnecessary because the District itself had previously determined that the pipeline should be replaced—a determination that in the court’s view sustained a standard of care calling for replacement.
At ¶ 1.
We granted certiorari and now reverse the decision of the court of appeals. The District’s internal decision recommending replacement did not establish that such a move was required by a standard of care. And because the question whether a pipeline needs to be replaced is outside the knowledge and experience of average lay persons, the homeowners had an obligation to designate an expert to establish a basis for such a duty. Their failure to do so was fatal to their negligence claim, and the district court was right to dismiss it on summary judgment. We reverse the court of appeals on that basis, while vacating—without reaching—the other grounds for its decision.
At ¶ 2.
The court of appeals’ determination that expert testimony was unnecessary rested on a simple premise: that an internal recommendation of replacement sustained a tort law duty to do so. See id. ¶ 40 (characterizing the pipeline as “obsolete”). We find that premise problematic.
At ¶ 13.
An internal determination that a pipeline should be re-placed does not establish a tort law duty to do so. Internal decisions may be made for any number of reasons—convenience, caution, maximization of budget, mistake—having little to do with the standard of care. Thus, the resolution of this issue cannot be “narrowly focused,” as the court of appeals put it, “on the decision to delay three years before replacing the [pipeline].” Id. ¶ 37.
At ¶ 14.
Instead, the critical issue is whether the applicable standard of care required the District to replace the pipeline near the Jenkins home. See Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, ¶ 10, 979 P. 2d 317 (“In order to prevail on a negligence claim, there must be evidence of a duty breached.”). And we cannot see how the Jenkinses could show that it did without expert testimony.
At ¶ 15.
A history of breakage is not a mandate for replacement.4 Often the prudent response will be repair, not outright replacement. And the repair/replace decision is inherently complex and case-specific, requiring the detail necessary to perform the cost-benefit calculus and the sophistication necessary to interpret it.
At ¶ 19.
In the absence of expert assistance, jurors would not likely possess the information or understanding necessary to make such assessments. . . .
At ¶ 20.
[L]eft to their own devices, jurors would be forced to speculate about how a reasonable water conservancy district would act, and about whether the District failed to conform to that standard by failing to replace the 3300 South pipeline earli-er.10 Such speculation has no place in our courtrooms—on matters of duty, breach, or otherwise. See Slisze, 1999 UT 20, ¶ 10 (“In order to prevail on a negligence claim, there must be evidence of a duty breached.”).
At ¶ 21.
The court of appeals accordingly erred in concluding that the Jenkinses needed no expert testimony to establish a standard of care requiring replacement of the District’s pipeline. We therefore reverse. In so doing, we also vacate the remainder of the court of appeals’ decision.. . .
At ¶ 22.
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