January 30, 2014, Utah Court of Appeals Case Summaries

Unifund CCR v. Chan, 2014 UT App 25 (January 30, 2014)

            This is a Per Curiam decision in a debt collection matter.  Essentially the court holds that there is not a substantial issue for appellate review because the Appellees corrected a purported dispute of fact by filing a second Motion for Summary Judgment that addressed Appellants concerns and Appellant failed to file a rule 59 motion within the required ten days.

Jessop v. Hardman, 2014 UT App 28 (January 30, 2014)

Issues: Sufficiency of the Evidence; Irregularity in the Proceedings; Utah R. Evid. 606.

            This case involves a tort claim and appeals from the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial alleging insufficient evidence to support the verdict and “irregularit[ies] in the proceedings.”  The facts of the case are essentially that an Hardman left a hot iron on an ironing board and left the room closing the door behind him.  Hardman’s friend puts a baby in a car seat next to the ironing board without telling Hardman.  The baby pulls the iron’s cord and severely burns itself.

            The irregularity in the proceedings was the court bailiff’s refusal to let two jurors call family to let them know the trial ran longer than expected and to make new arrangements for previously scheduled events.

            Appellant also challenges the trial court’s striking a paragraph from a juror’s declaration that was submitted in support of her Motion for New Trial.

            The Court rejects the insufficient evidence to support the verdict because there is no duty to warn a visitor of an open and obvious danger, and there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the iron was an open and obvious danger.

            The Court rejects the irregularities argument because it did not see any sign of coercion relating to the verdict.  The jurors were free to communicate with the judge about any concerns they had and they did not express any feelings of time constraints.

            The Court holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking a portion of the juror’s affidavit pursuant to Utah R. of Evid. 606.  The opinion contains a basic outline of the purpose of rule 606 and the importance of keeping jury deliberations confidential.

            Some important statements by the court are as follows:

“The trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial will be reversed only if ‘the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.’” Mann v. Fredrickson, 2006 UT App 475, ¶ 8, 153 P.3d 768 (quoting Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982)).

At ¶ 5

The trial judge did not give an Allen instruction, impose time limits on the jury, or otherwise urge the jurors to deliberate quickly. Indeed, no act of the trial judge is even at issue here. Moreover, the jurors knew how to communicate with the judge and in fact did so twice during deliberations, yet they never expressed concern over the timing of their deliberations. They deliberated for two hours. The judge stated that he met with all the jurors afterward and none mentioned a time constraint.4 We see no abuse of discretion here.

At ¶ 21.

We conclude that the trial court’s rulings were well within its discretion. The court refused to strike paragraph 4 of the declaration, which describes actions of the bailiff and other facts outside the jury’s deliberations. But the court struck paragraph 6, which describes the deliberations themselves and one juror’s opinion of other jurors’ mental states and voting motivations

At ¶ 29.

January 28, 2014 Utah Supreme Court Case Summaries

MacGregor v. Walker, 2014 UT 2, No. 20120452 (January 28, 2014)

Issue: voluntary assumption of a duty to aid abuse victims.

            In this case, the Supreme Court determines that The Church Of Jesus Chirst of Latter-day Saints did not voluntarily assume a duty to aid abuse victims by setting up a “Help Line” for clergymen who become aware of an abusive situation because 1) regardless of whether the Church voluntarily undertook to render a service to abuse victims by virtue of the Help Line, a clergy member’s failure to use the Help Line does not increase a victim’s risk of harm; and 2) public policy disfavors the imposition of a duty where it would discourage organizations from providing services that may ultimately benefit victims of abuse.  The following statements contain the most relevant language:

            Here, MacGregor argues that the Church Defendants owed her an affirmative duty to act under section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 323 provides:

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.

At ¶ 12.

            Before a duty arises under section 323, a plaintiff must establish not only the existence of a voluntary undertaking, but also that (a) the undertaking increased plaintiff’s risk of harm, or (b) the harm suffered by the plaintiff resulted from plaintiff’s reliance on the undertaking. MacGregor does not claim that she relied on the Help Line. We therefore consider whether the Church’s creation of the Help Line increased her risk of harm.

At ¶ 19.

            MacGregor’s claim does not satisfy subsection (a) because neither the creation of the Help Line nor Walker’s alleged failure to use it increased the risk of harm to MacGregor. In other words, Walker’s alleged negligent performance did not put MacGregor in a worse position than she would have been in had the Church never created the Help Line.

At ¶ 24.

January 24, 2014, Utah Court of Appeals Case Summaries

Austin v. Bingham, 2014 UT App 15, No. 20120765-CA (January 24, 2014)

Issue: Findings of Fact Concerning Damages

            This case is about a land dispute between neighbors about a right-of-way that escalated into verbal threats, abusive behavior, and restrictions to the right-of-way.  The appellant challenges several findings of fact regarding damages.

            Basically the court emphasizes the duty to marshal evidence supporting the trial court’s findings and that they will defer to the trial court. The court finds that documentary proof of medical bills is not required for a court to make a finding if it finds testimony concerning the medical bills credible.

            At paragraph 19 the court states:

            Proof of the amount of damages does not require precision. Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1983). Rather, a plaintiff need only put on “evidence that rises above speculation and provides a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages.” Atkin, 709 P.2d at 336. Proof of damages may therefore “be based upon approximations, if . . . the approximations are based upon reasonable assumptions or projections.” Id. This is because once the fact of damages has been established, any uncertainty in the amount of damages must be borne by the wrongdoer. Id.; see also Cook, 664 P.2d at 1166.

            The Court also rejects several arguments because the appellants failed to preserve them below.

Holladay v. Gunnison, 2014 UT App 17, No. 20120400-CA (January 24, 2014)

Issue: Contract Interpretation

            This case involves interpretation of a contract between two banks.  Both banks owned an interest in a defaulted loan and the property was not sufficient collateral for the loan.  The banks disagreed on how to apportion the proceeds of the collateral.  The trial court ruled that the contract was unambiguous and refused to consider extrinsic evidence support one bank’s argument.

            The Court of Appeals concludes that the provisions of the contract are ambiguous and that the extrinsic evidence should have been considered to determine the parties’ intent.

            At paragraph 12 the Court states:

      In interpreting a contract, appellate courts “look to the writing itself to ascertain the parties’ intentions.” Jones v. ERA Brokers Consol., 2000 UT 61, ¶ 12, 6 P.3d 1129. A contract is ambiguous “if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.” Daines, 2008 UT 51, ¶ 25 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). But terms are not ambiguous “simply because one party seeks to endow them with a different interpretation according to his or her own interests.” Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, ¶ 17, 133 P.3d 428. Rather, “the proffered alternate interpretation . . . must be based upon the usual and natural meaning of the language used and may not be the result of a forced or strained construction.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “When an ambiguity exists [in a contract], the intent of the parties becomes a question of fact,” WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ¶ 22, 54 P.3d 1139 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and courts “may consider extrinsic evidence to determine” the contract’s meaning, Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996).

 Q-2, LLC v. Hughes, 2014 UT App 19, No. 20120607-CA (January 24, 2014)

Issue: Adverse Possession and Boundary by Acquiescence

            This case is about 1) when legal title to property transfers under the boundary by acquiescence doctrine; 2) the effect this decision has on subsequent adverse possession claims

A boundary by acquiescence is established when, for a period of at least twenty years, adjacent landowners mutually acquiesce to a visible boundary line and occupy the property up to that line.  See Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996). The determination of when, for purposes of adjudicating the rights of later possessors, the legal title to property transfers under the boundary by acquiescence doctrine appears to be an issue of first impression for Utah Courts.

At ¶ 8.

We . . . conclude that once adjacent landowners have acquiesced to a visible boundary other than the recorded property line for the requisite twenty years, the encroaching landowner’s possession “ripen[s] into legal title” by operation of law, extinguishing the other landowner’s legal title to any part of the disputed land and leaving the previous owner with only “bare record title.” See Brown, 622 P.2d at 1177. Thus, a judicial determination of a boundary by acquiescence and quieting of title merely recognizes what has already occurred by operation of law: the transfer of legal title of the disputed land to the occupying landowner.

At ¶ 11.

            To establish a claim of adverse possession under color of title, the Hugheses must establish that they held and possessed the property adversely to the legal title for at least seven years prior to commencement of litigation. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-208 (LexisNexis 2008). While occupation of real property is generally presumed to be “under and in subordination to the legal title,” id. property will be “considered to have been adversely held if a person in possession of the property . . . possesses a written document purporting to convey title,” id. § 78B-2-210(1). “In order to establish title by adverse possession, the party claiming adverse possession has the burden of proving that possession was open, notorious, and hostile and that taxes were paid for the entire statutory period.” Marchant v. Park City, 788 P.2d 520, 523–24 (Utah 1990).

At ¶ 15.

Because legal title passed to Q-2’s predecessor-in-interest by 1971, the Hugheses’ predecessor-in-interest could convey only “bare record title” to the disputed property to the Hugheses by the 1998 warranty deed, and legal title rested with Q-2 or its predecessor-in-interest at that time. Thus, the Hugheses’ possession of the entire property described by their warranty deed was adverse to the legal title of the disputed property. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-210.

At ¶ 16.

            Judge Orme concurs in the decision, but writes concurrently to express his strong concern that the legal transfer of title prior to judicial declaration will have a bad effect upon the transferability of title and the trust citizens put in their deeds.  He asks the Supreme Court to accept certiorari and to reconsider the precedents that compelled this decision.

Red Bridge v. JAR Family Investment, 2014 UT App 21, No. 20130365-CA (January 24, 2014)

Issue: Unconscionability

            Appellants appeal the trial court’s order dismissing their contract dispute, which was based on an argument that the contract was substantively unconscionable, because in issuing its order the trial court made the mistaken statement that there must be both procedural and substantive unconscionability for an unconscionability case to prevail.

            The Court notes the mistake, in some circumstances substantive unconscionability alone is enough, but finds that it does not matter because the trial court found the contract at issue was not substantively unconscionable.  Appellants’ challenge to that finding was not adequately briefed.