January 24, 2014, Utah Court of Appeals Case Summaries

Austin v. Bingham, 2014 UT App 15, No. 20120765-CA (January 24, 2014)

Issue: Findings of Fact Concerning Damages

            This case is about a land dispute between neighbors about a right-of-way that escalated into verbal threats, abusive behavior, and restrictions to the right-of-way.  The appellant challenges several findings of fact regarding damages.

            Basically the court emphasizes the duty to marshal evidence supporting the trial court’s findings and that they will defer to the trial court. The court finds that documentary proof of medical bills is not required for a court to make a finding if it finds testimony concerning the medical bills credible.

            At paragraph 19 the court states:

            Proof of the amount of damages does not require precision. Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1983). Rather, a plaintiff need only put on “evidence that rises above speculation and provides a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages.” Atkin, 709 P.2d at 336. Proof of damages may therefore “be based upon approximations, if . . . the approximations are based upon reasonable assumptions or projections.” Id. This is because once the fact of damages has been established, any uncertainty in the amount of damages must be borne by the wrongdoer. Id.; see also Cook, 664 P.2d at 1166.

            The Court also rejects several arguments because the appellants failed to preserve them below.

Holladay v. Gunnison, 2014 UT App 17, No. 20120400-CA (January 24, 2014)

Issue: Contract Interpretation

            This case involves interpretation of a contract between two banks.  Both banks owned an interest in a defaulted loan and the property was not sufficient collateral for the loan.  The banks disagreed on how to apportion the proceeds of the collateral.  The trial court ruled that the contract was unambiguous and refused to consider extrinsic evidence support one bank’s argument.

            The Court of Appeals concludes that the provisions of the contract are ambiguous and that the extrinsic evidence should have been considered to determine the parties’ intent.

            At paragraph 12 the Court states:

      In interpreting a contract, appellate courts “look to the writing itself to ascertain the parties’ intentions.” Jones v. ERA Brokers Consol., 2000 UT 61, ¶ 12, 6 P.3d 1129. A contract is ambiguous “if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.” Daines, 2008 UT 51, ¶ 25 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). But terms are not ambiguous “simply because one party seeks to endow them with a different interpretation according to his or her own interests.” Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, ¶ 17, 133 P.3d 428. Rather, “the proffered alternate interpretation . . . must be based upon the usual and natural meaning of the language used and may not be the result of a forced or strained construction.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “When an ambiguity exists [in a contract], the intent of the parties becomes a question of fact,” WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ¶ 22, 54 P.3d 1139 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and courts “may consider extrinsic evidence to determine” the contract’s meaning, Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996).

 Q-2, LLC v. Hughes, 2014 UT App 19, No. 20120607-CA (January 24, 2014)

Issue: Adverse Possession and Boundary by Acquiescence

            This case is about 1) when legal title to property transfers under the boundary by acquiescence doctrine; 2) the effect this decision has on subsequent adverse possession claims

A boundary by acquiescence is established when, for a period of at least twenty years, adjacent landowners mutually acquiesce to a visible boundary line and occupy the property up to that line.  See Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996). The determination of when, for purposes of adjudicating the rights of later possessors, the legal title to property transfers under the boundary by acquiescence doctrine appears to be an issue of first impression for Utah Courts.

At ¶ 8.

We . . . conclude that once adjacent landowners have acquiesced to a visible boundary other than the recorded property line for the requisite twenty years, the encroaching landowner’s possession “ripen[s] into legal title” by operation of law, extinguishing the other landowner’s legal title to any part of the disputed land and leaving the previous owner with only “bare record title.” See Brown, 622 P.2d at 1177. Thus, a judicial determination of a boundary by acquiescence and quieting of title merely recognizes what has already occurred by operation of law: the transfer of legal title of the disputed land to the occupying landowner.

At ¶ 11.

            To establish a claim of adverse possession under color of title, the Hugheses must establish that they held and possessed the property adversely to the legal title for at least seven years prior to commencement of litigation. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-208 (LexisNexis 2008). While occupation of real property is generally presumed to be “under and in subordination to the legal title,” id. property will be “considered to have been adversely held if a person in possession of the property . . . possesses a written document purporting to convey title,” id. § 78B-2-210(1). “In order to establish title by adverse possession, the party claiming adverse possession has the burden of proving that possession was open, notorious, and hostile and that taxes were paid for the entire statutory period.” Marchant v. Park City, 788 P.2d 520, 523–24 (Utah 1990).

At ¶ 15.

Because legal title passed to Q-2’s predecessor-in-interest by 1971, the Hugheses’ predecessor-in-interest could convey only “bare record title” to the disputed property to the Hugheses by the 1998 warranty deed, and legal title rested with Q-2 or its predecessor-in-interest at that time. Thus, the Hugheses’ possession of the entire property described by their warranty deed was adverse to the legal title of the disputed property. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-210.

At ¶ 16.

            Judge Orme concurs in the decision, but writes concurrently to express his strong concern that the legal transfer of title prior to judicial declaration will have a bad effect upon the transferability of title and the trust citizens put in their deeds.  He asks the Supreme Court to accept certiorari and to reconsider the precedents that compelled this decision.

Red Bridge v. JAR Family Investment, 2014 UT App 21, No. 20130365-CA (January 24, 2014)

Issue: Unconscionability

            Appellants appeal the trial court’s order dismissing their contract dispute, which was based on an argument that the contract was substantively unconscionable, because in issuing its order the trial court made the mistaken statement that there must be both procedural and substantive unconscionability for an unconscionability case to prevail.

            The Court notes the mistake, in some circumstances substantive unconscionability alone is enough, but finds that it does not matter because the trial court found the contract at issue was not substantively unconscionable.  Appellants’ challenge to that finding was not adequately briefed.