November 1, 2013 Utah Supreme Court Case Summaries

Waddoups v. Noorda, 2013 UT 64, No. 20120310 (November 1, 2013)

ISSUES: Negligent Credentialing, Retroactive Application of a Statute

Justice Nehring,

The Federal District Court for the District of Utah has certified the following question to this court:

Does section 78B-3-425 of the Utah Code clarify existing law and therefore retroactively apply to bar negligent credentialing claims that arose prior to its enactment?

Utah Code section 78B-3-425 reads:

Prohibition on cause of action for negligent credentialing. It is the policy of this state that the question of negligent credentialing, as applied to health care providers in malpractice suits, is not recognized as a cause of action.

We hold that Utah Code section 78B-3-425, because it is a substantive amendment and contains no expression of retroactivity, does not apply retroactively (to its effective date), and therefore does not bar Plaintiffs’ claim which arose prior to its enactment. 

At ¶ 1.

It is well established that “[t]he courts of this state operate under a statutory bar against the retroactive application of newly codified laws,” and therefore “parties’ substantive rights and liabilities are determined by the law in place at the time when a cause of action arises.” The statute barring retroactive application of new laws contains a single exception, “[a] provision of the Utah Code is not retroactive, unless the provision is expressly declared to be retroactive. “Thus, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, we generally presume that a statute applies only prospectively.” “The intent to have a statute operate retroactively may be indicated by explicit [statutory] statements” to that effect, “or by clear and unavoidable implication that the statute operates on events already past.” . . .

At ¶ 6.

The statutory language in this case is a single sentence: “It is the policy of this state that the question of negligent credentialing, as applied to health care providers in malpractice suits, is not recognized as a cause of action.” This phrase contains no words indicative of retroactive application, nor does any language appear that evinces a “clear and unavoidable implication that the statute operates on events already past.” Both of the verbs which appear in the sentence are in present tense: “is” and “is not recognized.” It simply cannot be said that the use of the present tense communicates a clear and unavoidable implication that the statute operates on events already past. If anything, use of the present tense implies an intent that the statute apply to the present, as of its effective date, and continuing forward. There is nothing ambiguous about the statute that would necessitate further analysis beyond the plain language. However, that does not end our analysis.

At ¶ 7.

In addition to the single statutory exception, we have long recognized a distinction between substantive and procedural laws as it relates to retroactive application of newly enacted statutes. Laws that “enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights” are substantive and are barred from retroactive application absent express legislative intent. However, laws which “merely pertain[] to and prescribe[] the practice and procedure or the legal machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made effective” are procedural and “may be given retrospective effect.” In purporting to eliminate the cause of action of negligent credentialing, section 78B-3-425 cannot be said to be merely procedural, but rather is clearly substantive in nature. IHC concedes this point. 

At ¶ 8.

The Court repudiates the clarifying amendments exception to the general rule that statutes do not apply retroactively.

At ¶¶ 9-11.

Garza v. Burnett, 2013 UT 66, No. 20120180 (November 1, 2013)

ISSUES: Equitable Tolling of Statute of Limitations for § 1983 Claims

Justice Nehring,

We have agreed to answer the following question certified to us by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit:

Under Tenth Circuit decisions at the time Gerardo Thomas Garza filed his complaint, approximately two years remained in [the] limitations period [before his claim would become time-barred]. A Supreme Court decision soon after filing, however, overturned those decisions and rendered his complaint approximately ten months late. Under Utah law, does an intervening change in controlling circuit law merit equitable tolling under these circumstances?

For the reasons set forth below, we hold that an intervening change in law does merit equitable tolling.

At ¶¶ 1-2.

. . . “Under our traditional principles of equitable tolling, the party seeking equitable tolling must first show that he was indeed disabled . . . from protecting his claim.” We have heretofore only found disability sufficient to warrant equitable tolling through application of the discovery rule. Today, we hold that an intervening change in controlling law that extinguishes a cause of action also constitutes disability sufficient to meet the high bar to warrant equitable tolling.

At ¶ 11.

It is not often that a timely filed claim retroactively becomes untimely because of a judicial decision. We recognize that “[t]hese shifting authorities have placed . . . [Mr.] Garza in an unusual position.” Officer Burnett argues that Mr. Garza is not entitled to equitable tolling because he has failed to show that he could not reasonably have complied with the limitations period. Officer Burnett’s argument is premised on the fact that at the time Mr. Garza’s conviction was reversed, Mr. Garza still had over fourteen months in which to timely file his complaint under Wallace, but failed to do so. Instead, Mr. Garza waited two years to do so. The flaw in Officer Burnett’s argument can be traced to the fact that when Mr. Garza filed his complaint, it was timely under then-controlling circuit precedent. Statutes of limitations do not differentiate between plaintiffs who file as soon as their claims accrue and those who wait until the end of the limitations period. At bottom, Officer Burnett does not argue that Mr. Garza should have been more timely, but rather he is arguing that Mr. Garza should have been more prophetic. The law does not penalize parties for prophetic inadequacy. Neither does the law punish people for circumstances that are completely out of their control.28 Refusing to equitably toll the statute of limitations under these circumstances would be manifestly unjust because Mr. Garza would lose his cause of action due to circumstances beyond his control and through no fault of his own.

At ¶ 12.

In consideration of the rationale underlying equitable tolling, we hold that when a change in controlling law extinguishes an individual’s cause of action, equity will toll the statute of limitations to afford the plaintiff a reasonable period of time after the change in law to bring his claim. Indeed, this is precisely the type of circumstance that merits equitable tolling. 

At ¶ 14.

Accordingly, a plaintiff that files timely before the change in law renders the claim untimely will uniformly satisfy this reasonable period of time. As such, Mr. Garza is entitled to equitable tolling because his claim was timely under Tenth Circuit precedent as it existed at the time of filing but was rendered untimely retroactively by the intervening change in law effectuated by the Supreme Court’s Wallace decision.

At ¶ 15.

Francis v. State, 2013 UT 65 No. 20111027 (November 1, 2013)

This is an amendment to 2013 UT 43.  The Court rewrites the 3^rd sentence in paragraph 47.  It does not appear to be a substantive change.