March 19, 2013, Utah Supreme Court Case

March 19, 2013

Utah Supreme Court Cases

Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, Nos. 20110277, 20110473 (March 19, 2013)

JUSTICE DURHAM authored the majority opinion in which JUSTICE PARRISH and JUSTICE NEHRING joined.

JUSTICE LEE filed a concurring, dissenting opinion in which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT joined.

Justice Durham,

Appellants brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of a law, claiming that the law violated the state constitution in four respects. The district court dismissed the first two claims and rejected the second two claims on summary judgment. On appeal, we consider whether Appellants had standing to bring these claims in the first place. We hold that, although they lacked the personal injury required for traditional standing, Appellants had public-interest standing to bring the first two claims. We also hold that they did not have standing to bring the second two claims under either the traditional or the public-interest doctrine of standing, and we accordingly vacate the grant of summary judgment on those claims and remand to the district court for dismissal. Finally, we hold that although Appellants had standing to bring the first two claims, the district court properly dismissed the claims under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b)(6).

At ¶ 1.

Appellants claimed the Bill was unconstitutional in four respects. The first two claims fall under Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that “no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.” (Emphasis added.) Appellants argue that the Bill as a whole violates this provision in two respects: first, they argue that it contained “more than one subject”; second, that its subject was not “clearly expressed in its title” (collectively, the Article VI Claims). The second two claims fall under Article X, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that “[t]he general control and supervision of the public education system shall be vested in a State Board of Education.” Appellants argue that two items of the Bill violate this provision: first, the item that delegates the administration of the Teacher Salary Supplement Program to the Department of Human Resources; second, the item that delegates textbook approval to private entities (collectively, the Article X Claims).

At ¶ 4.

The Court discusses Public Interest Standing

Unlike in the federal system, our law recognizes that appropriate plaintiffs without individualized injury may nevertheless possess standing to bring certain claims treating issues of great public importance. We determine that the issues underlying the Article VI Claims rise to this level and that Appellants are appropriate parties to bring these claims; Appellants therefore have standing to raise the Article VI Claims. The issues underlying the Article X claims, however, do not rise to this level, and furthermore Appellants are not appropriately situated to bring them. Accordingly, they do not have standing to raise the Article X claims.

On the merits of the district court’s dismissal of the Article VI Claims, we hold that even on the facts alleged by Appellants, the Bill does not violate either the single-subject or clear-title rules of Article VI, Section 22. Accordingly, the dismissal is affirmed.

At ¶¶ 9-10.

While it is “the usual rule that one must be personally adversely affected before he has standing to prosecute an action. . . . it is also true this Court may grant standing where matters of great public interest and societal impact are concerned.” Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1978).

At ¶ 12.

[W]e engage in a three-step inquiry in reviewing the question of a plaintiff’s standing to sue. The first step in the inquiry will be directed to the traditional criteria of the plaintiff’s personal stake in the controversy. . . . If the plaintiff does not have standing under the first step, we will then address the question of whether there is anyone who has a greater interest in the outcome of the case than the plaintiff. If there is no one, and if the issue is unlikely to be raised at all if the plaintiff is denied standing, this Court will grant standing. . . . The Court will deny standing when a plaintiff does not satisfy the first requirement of the analysis and there are potential plaintiffs with a more direct interest in the issues who can more adequately litigate the issues. The third step in the analysis is to decide if the issues raised by the plaintiff are of sufficient public importance in and of themselves to grant him standing.

At ¶ 13 (quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Emphasis added)).

In Jenkins v. Swan we framed the middle step of the “threestep inquiry” as “the question of whether there is anyone who has a greater interest in the outcome of the case than the plaintiff.” 675 P.2d at 1150. In Cedar Mountain, however, we modified the inquiry, requiring a determination of whether the plaintiff is “an appropriate party.” 2009 UT 48, ¶ 8 (emphasis added).

At ¶ 15.

Under the alternative test, a petitioning party must first establish that it is an appropriate party to raise the issue in the dispute before the court. A party meets this burden by demonstrating that it has the interest necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions and that the issues are unlikely to be raised if the party is denied standing. We recognize that there is language in both Jenkins [v. Swan] and subsequent cases suggesting that in making this determination the court may grant standing only to the party with the greatest interest in the case, or in other words, the most appropriate party. We now conclude, however, that the notion that a court must find the most appropriate party, thereby limiting standing under the alternative criteria to only one party in any given case, is unnecessary and counter-productive. . . . [A] court addressing standing under the alternative test does not need to determine which party seeking to intervene is the most appropriate party in comparison to any other potential party, but rather needs to determine only which parties are, in fact, appropriate parties to a full and fair litigation of the dispute in question.

. . . .

In addition, an appropriate party must still satisfy the second part of the alternative test before we will grant standing. Once a party has established that it is an appropriate party to the litigation, it must also demonstrate that the issues it seeks to raise are of sufficient public importance in and of themselves to warrant granting the party standing.

At ¶ 15 (quoting Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74,

¶¶ 36, 39, 148 P.3d 960 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Court determines that Appellants do not have traditional standing on any of their claims.

At ¶¶ 19-24.

The Article VI claims rise to the level of great constitutional importance, and Appellants are appropriately situated to raise them.

At ¶¶ 25-32.

The “appropriateness” of a party under the public-interest standing doctrine is a question of competency. In the Sierra Club case, we determined that the Club “would have standing under the alternative [public-interest] test” due to its policy concerns and status as an “entity focused on protecting the environment.” Id. ¶ 42. The coalition of Appellants in the instant case is not as well established or long-standing as the Sierra Club, but it similarly has policy concerns and has come together to “focus[] on” the instant constitutional challenge. Further, Appellants have shown themselves able to “effectively assist the court” in its consideration of the Article VI Claims.

At ¶ 29.

Sierra Club requires that “the issues [be] unlikely to be raised if the party is denied standing.” Id. ¶ 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). We can certainly construct hypothetical plaintiffs who might be seen to have traditional standing to bring at least some of Appellant’s claims. For instance, a teacher whose colleagues’ salaries were raised under the Teacher Salary Supplement Program, but whose own salary was left unchanged, might invoke direct economic interests. Similarly, we can imagine a suit brought by a textbook publisher whose materials were rejected pursuant to the Textbook Approval Program. But our inquiry is not whether some hypothetical plaintiff can be imagined; it is whether “the issues are unlikely to be raised if the party is denied [publicinterest] standing.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, where the Board itself is silent and no other plaintiff has emerged in the years since the Bill’s passage, we think that is indeed unlikely.

At ¶ 30.

One more feature of our prior statements on public-interest standing deserves mention. In Sierra Club, we observed that a court’s recognition that a party has public-interest standing analysis

requires the court to determine not only that the issues are of a sufficient weight but also that they are not more appropriately addressed by another branch of government pursuant to the political process. The more generalized the issues, the more likely they ought to be resolved in the legislative or executive branches.

Id. ¶ 39 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  But Article VI, Section 22 places restrictions on the legislative process itself. Where the legislature has passed a bill and the governor has signed it, we cannot assume that either of those branches are appropriate parties to whom to entrust the prosecution of a claim that the bill violates the strictures of Article I, Section 22. And “more generalized” in this context speaks not to the general nature of the interest—for that is inherent in every issue of “sufficient weight” to justify the recognition of public-interest standing—but rather to the generalized nature of the issue itself.17 In other words, public-interest standing should not be used by courts to engage in review of nonjusticiable political questions. Here, Appellants’ claims do not raise that type of question. Rather, they seek to enforce an explicit and mandatory constitutional provision dealing primarily with questions of form and process. See UTAH CONST. art. I, § 26 (“The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.”).

At ¶ 31.

The Article X Claims do not Rise to the Same Level of Great Constitutional Importance, and Appellants Are Not Appropriately Situated to Raise Them

At ¶¶ 33-37.

Appellants fail to satisfy either element of the public interest standing test with respect to their Article X Claims. First, while we have explained above that Appellants are “appropriate part[ies]” to raise the Article VI Claims, they are not as well situated to raise the Article X Claims. While the restrictions on the legislative process imposed by Article I, Section 22 give every citizen of Utah an interest in seeing them obeyed, the delegation in Article X, Section 3 of “general control and supervision of the public education system” to the Board does not create such a general interest. Further, Appellants below and in their briefs and argument on appeal have not proved themselves able to “assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions.” Id. ¶ 36 The crucial question of how we are to understand the scope of “general control and supervision of the public education system,” and the related question of what the historical practice and traditional core functions of the Board have been, were never sufficiently framed and answered. This played a role in the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the Article X Claims.

At ¶ 35.

Every constitutional provision is surely important, but not every alleged violation of a constitutional provision will provide a basis for public-interest standing. As discussed above, the single subject and clear-title rules imposed on the legislature by Article VI, Section 22 meet that standard. They are restrictions which must be observed every time the legislature exercises its core function of passing laws. The provision at issue in the Article X Claims, in contrast, is a delegation of a defined subject to a particular agency. While we do not conclude that such questions can never be appropriate ones in which to employ the public-interest standing doctrine, in combination with the Appellants’ lack of “appropriateness” to treat them, their more localized significance renders the public-interest standing doctrine inapplicable to these plaintiffs on these claims.

At ¶ 36

The Court dismisses the Article VI Claims

The Complaint did not state a violation of the single-subject rule

At ¶¶ 39-52.

Almost a century ago, this court opined that while the single-subject rule

is mandatory and binding alike upon the courts and the Legislature, yet it should be liberally construed in favor of upholding a law, and should be so applied as to effectuate its purpose in preventing the combination of incongruous subjects neither of which could be passed when standing alone. A too strict application of the provision might, however, result in hampering wholesome legislation upon any comprehensive subject rather than in preventing evils.

At ¶ 40. (quoting Salt Lake City v. Wilson, 148 P. 1104, 1109 (Utah 1915).)

Furthermore, while bills must address a single subject, “’[t]here is no constitutional restriction as to the scope or magnitude of the single subject of a legislative act.’” Martineau v. Crabbe, 150 P. 301, 304 (Utah 1915) (emphasis added) (quoting the North Dakota Supreme Court’s interpretation of their constitution’s single-subject rule in State v. Morgan, 48 N.W. 314, 317 (N.D. 1891)). “A liberal view should be taken of both the act and the constitutional provisions so as not to hamper the law making power, but to permit the adoption of comprehensive measures covering a whole subject.” Kent Club v. Toronto, 305 P.2d 870, 873 (Utah 1957)(discussing both the single subject and clear-title rules).

At ¶ 40.

Examined on its face, under this liberal standard the Bill does not violate the single-subject rule. All its provisions deal with public education. With one very minor exception, all its enactments and amendments are confined to Title 53A of the Utah Code. We do not suggest that such confinement to one title or general subject area will always shield a law from claims that it violates the singlesubject rule. Nor do we suggest that legislation which amends items located in two or more titles will per se be ruled unconstitutional. We have never established, and do not create today, a precise formula for determining whether a challenged act “contain[s] more than one subject.” UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 22. Such a formula may well be impossible to craft,22 and might be undesirable even if it were possible.

At ¶ 42.

The Complaint did not state a violation of the clear title rule

At ¶¶ 53-61.

[T]he title is sufficient if it is not productive of surprise and fraud and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, but is of such character as fairly to apprise the legislators and the public of the subject matter of the legislation and to put anyone having an interest in the subject on inquiry.

At ¶ 55. (quoting Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 197 P.2d 477, 508 (Utah 1948) (Latimer, J., concurring)).

The Court concludes that a bill’s “long title” is a part of the “title” for purposes of Article 6, Section 22.

At ¶¶ 56-61.

Justice Lee, concurring in part, dissenting in part,

[A]lthough we have long recognized a “traditional” conception of standing requiring individualized injuries sustaining private rights of action, our more recent decisions have exhibited increasing willingness to overlook that requirement under a “public interest” exception. That exception, as reconceived by the court today, stretches the principle of standing beyond recognition.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s invocation—and extension—of this “public interest” exception to the traditional requirement of standing. Its methodology is incompatible with the judicial power clause in Article VIII of the Utah Constitution. That clause limits our authority to the resolution of cases that fall within the traditional conception of the judicial power. In overriding these constraints, the majority robs the constitutional limits on our power of meaningful content. It does so to uphold standing for the Article VI claimants in this case on public interest grounds, thereby subjecting the standing inquiry to the arbitrary discretion of the court, under a standardless “test” that is little more than a post-hoc justification for a preferred result. Under this test, the standing question is left to a subjective, case-by-case assessment of a majority of the court as to whether the claims seem sufficiently “important” to merit review.

Instead of expanding the public interest exception, I would repudiate our prior dicta on this point and reject the exception altogether. And I would resolve the case under a traditional formulation of standing—one requiring an assertion of injury sustaining a private action. That formulation, in my view, requires dismissal of all of the claims at issue in this case, including the Article VI claims the majority reaches on public interest grounds.

At ¶¶ 63-65.