Utah Supreme Court Cases, March 5, 2013

March 5, 2013

Utah Supreme Court Cases

Van De Grift v. State, 2013 UT 11, No. 20110994 (March 5, 2013)

Affirming Judge Paul Maughn’s, Third District, Salt Lake Department decision that the Governmental Immunity Act barred Plaintiff’s claim alleging negligent supervision of a parolee.

Justice Nehring,

Background:

UTAH CODE § 63G-7-301(5)(b) provides an exception to the waiver of governmental immunity for any “injury [that] arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights.” 

Appellants argue that the deceit exception to immunity should apply only to deceit by a government employee, not to deceit by a third party.

Holding:

[T]he plain language of [Utah Code § 63G-7-301(5)(b)] forecloses Appellants’ argument that the intentional torts listed must be committed by an employee of the State.

At. ¶ 9.

We clarify that subsection (b) contemplates only the intentional tort of deceit. It appears in a list of other intentional torts. . . . In the Governmental Immunity Act, subsection (f) is broader than subsection (b). Subsection (f) covers misrepresentation by a government employee, even if it is negligent or does not amount to deceit. Deceit in subsection (b) refers to the intentional tort of deceit, not any action that could colloquially be described as deceitful.

At ¶ 13.

Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain, 2013 UT 12, Nos. 20100928 March 5, 2013)

Affirming Judge Robert Hilder, Third District., Salt Lake Department

The D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership (Osguthorpe) appeals the district court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration of claims between ASC Utah, Inc., (ASCU) and Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. (Wolf Mountain).

Justice Durham,

The Court reviews the provisions of the contract and determines:

Upon close examination of the default and arbitration provisions of the SPA Agreement, we conclude that the SPA disputes between ASCU and Wolf Mountain are not within the scope of the arbitration provision and that even if they were, Osguthorpe would not have a right to compel arbitration of claims between two other parties.

At. ¶ 9.

In response to Appellants complaint that its due process rights were violated when the trial court ruled on its motion without allowing oral argument, the Court states:

We have held that “due process requires that those with an interest in a proceeding be given notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner before their interests are adjudicated by a court.” Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass’n v. Atherton, 2011 UT 58, ¶ 2, 267 P.3d 227. Here, Osguthorpe fully briefed the matter to the district court, and the court noted in its written order that it “read all of the briefing.” The district court complied with rule 7(e) in ruling on the motion without a hearing, see supra ¶ 18, and Osguthorpe has not argued that rule 7(e) is constitutionally inadequate.

At ¶ 19.