March 8, 2013, Utah Supreme Court Cases

March 8, 2013

Utah Supreme Court Cases

Central Utah v. King, 2013 UT 13, No. 20110618 (March 8, 2013)

The Court affirms the Court of Appeal’s ruling that King’s appeal was not from a final order, and that the Court of Appeals, therefore, lacked jurisdiction.

[W]e now clarify the necessity of compliance with rule 7(f)(2) and reiterate that the rule applies to all final decisions of a district court. In other words, rule 7(f)(2) applies whether a party seeks to preserve or deny appellate jurisdiction. In either case, the appeal period begins only after one of three events occurs: (1) the court approves an order submitted with an initial memorandum; (2) the court enters an order prepared by counsel and served on opposing counsel pursuant to rule 7(f)(2); or (3) the court explicitly directs that no additional order is necessary.

At ¶ 15.

In the case before us, when the district court denied Mr. King’s motion for new trial, it entered the Ruling and Order setting forth its reasons for doing so. The district court did not, however, “give the parties explicit direction that no [additional] order [was] required.” Code, 2007 UT 43, ¶ 6. Therefore, the window for an appeal had not yet opened. Rule 7(f)(2) required the District, as the prevailing party, to submit a proposed order in conformity with the district court’s ruling within fifteen days. When the District failed to do so, Mr. King had the option of submitting his own proposed order for the purpose of finalizing the district court’s decision. Until one of the parties did so, however, the window for an appeal remained closed.

At ¶ 22.

The fact that the district court titled its written decision “Ruling and Order” does not change our analysis. Mr. King argues that the document issued by the district court “was not just a ruling, but . . . also the order formalizing and finalizing that ruling for all purposes.” He poses the question, “When a judge uses those words, can counsel tell him that he is not being clear enough?” While we acknowledge Mr. King’s concern, such a concern is assuaged by the mandatory nature of rule 7(f)(2) and our reasoning in Giusti. There, we stated that the strict application of the rule “removes the burden from litigants of discerning when the appeal period has been triggered.” Giusti, 2009 UT 2, ¶ 33. And because the district court in this case did not “explicitly direct that no additional order [was] necessary . . . rule 7(f)(2) require[d] the preparation and entry of a separate order in conformity with the court’s decision.” Id. ¶ 32 (internal quotation marks omitted).

At ¶ 23.

“The plain language of the rule requires an explicit direction if an order is not required by the court; it does not contemplate that the parties must engage in a guessing game to divine the court’s intentions.” Code, 2007 UT 43, ¶ 5 (emphasis added). To prevent such a guessing game, a district court that intends its ruling to represent its final, appealable order must explicitly state that no additional order is necessary.

At ¶ 24.