August 8, 2013, Utah Court of Appeal Case Summaries

State v. Walker, 2013 UT App 198, 20110979-CA (August 8, 2013)

ISSUE: Withdrawal of Guilty Plea; Jurisdiction; Waiver; Retroactive Application of Plea Withdrawal Statutes; Factual Innocence; Rule 11(e); Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Judge Christiansen,

Defendant Fredrick C. Walker appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of sexual abuse of a child. We affirm.

At ¶1.

Well after his release from prison, Defendant filed a motion on August 10, 2010, to withdraw his guilty plea—more than twenty‐five years after he originally entered into a plea agreement with the State. In support of his motion to withdraw his plea, Defendant produced affidavits from each of the three victims wherein they recant their original accusations of abuse. The State responded by contesting the trial court’s jurisdiction based on the timing provisions contained in the plea withdrawal statute. The court ruled that it had jurisdiction over Defendant’s motion and requested supplemental briefing on the merits of Defendant’s claim. In his supplemental brief, Defendant requested an evidentiary hearing. After considering the victims’ recantations and all other available records, the court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his request for an evidentiary hearing. Defendant now appeals.

At ¶ 7.

Jurisdiction

The State argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was untimely. The State maintains that “when Defendant waited to file his motion to withdraw, he became subject to the changing jurisdictional requirements that the [Utah] Legislature imposed on those motions—including the statute of limitations.” Because time limitations on causes of action become operative when they are enacted, the State argues that Defendant’s motion is governed by the 1989 amendment to the plea withdrawal statute. That amendment requires motions to withdraw a guilty plea to be filed within thirty days following entry of the guilty plea. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (Michie Supp. 1989) (“A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion, and shall be made within thirty days after the entry of the plea.”). Prior to the 1989 amendment, no such time restriction existed. See id. (Allen Smith 1982). The State asserts that Defendant was put on constructive notice when the statute changed in 1989, and therefore, Defendant had thirty days from the moment the new time limitation became effective to file his motion to withdraw. According to the State, because Defendant failed to file his motion within the thirty‐day limit, no court had jurisdiction to hear his motion to withdraw.

At ¶ 13.

[T]he State cites State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, 251 P.3d 829, “for the simple[] proposition that [courts] apply the law as it exists at the time of the event regulated by the law in question,” id. ¶ 13. In this case, the State argues that the “event regulated by the law in question” is Defendant’s 2010 motion to withdraw his guilty plea, as opposed to Defendant’s act of entering his guilty plea in 1985. Under this reasoning, Defendant would be subject to the thirty-day time limit. However, our determination of the “event regulated by the law in question” turns on whether the plea withdrawal statute itself—not just the 1989 amendment—affects a party’s substantive or procedural rights. See id. ¶ 14. Because we hold that the plea withdrawal statute is substantive, see infra ¶¶ 23–25, the law that governs Defendant’s motion is the law in effect when he entered into his guilty plea in 1985. Consequently, we agree with the trial court that the thirty-day time limit does not apply under these circumstances. Regardless of how the State frames the issue, imposing the thirty-day time limit on Defendant’s motion to withdraw would be an impermissible retroactive application of the 1989 amendment, based on the holding in [State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993 (Utah 1993)] and the reasoning in Clark. Therefore, we conclude that the court properly exercised jurisdiction over Defendant’s motion.

At ¶ 16.

Res Judicata and Waiver

Claim preclusion has three requirements: (1) “both cases must involve the same parties or their privies”; (2) “the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action”; and (3) “the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.” Macris, 2000 UT 93, ¶ 20 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). There is no dispute that the first element is met because Defendant and the State are the parties in each action. As to the second element, the only surviving document from the habeas corpus action is Defendant’s pro se docketing statement taken from the appeal of the trial court’s denial of his habeas petition. A finding of claim preclusion necessarily involves a close analysis of the prior action’s issues and ruling. Without more reliable and accurate documentation, such as a copy of the actual habeas petition, a transcript of the hearing, or the judge’s written ruling, the State is unable to persuade us that the claims before us were, or could have and should have been, brought in Defendant’s 1986 habeas petition. Thus, we determine that Defendant’s motion is not barred by claim preclusion

At ¶ 18.

Alternatively, the State argues that Defendant’s claims should be dismissed on account of waiver. We conclude that Defendant did not waive his right to move for withdrawal of his guilty plea. “Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Transp., 2011 UT 35, ¶ 45, 266 P.3d 671 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It requires demonstration of three elements: “(1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the right.” Soter’s, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). “The intent to relinquish a right must be distinct, although it may be expressed or implied.” Wilson v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2012 UT 43, ¶ 61, 289 P.3d 369 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The State contends that Defendant waived his right to withdraw his guilty plea because he waited twenty-three years to do so after his petition for habeas corpus was denied. According to the State, this delay constituted an intentional relinquishment of Defendant’s right to withdraw his plea. Defendant argues that his delay is not, on its own, a sufficient indication of intent to relinquish his right. We agree with Defendant. Although Defendant’s delay is relevant, without additional facts demonstrating a distinct intent to relinquish his right to withdraw his guilty plea, we cannot conclude that waiver applies.

At ¶¶ 19-20.

Controlling version of the plea withdrawal statute

Next, we must determine which version of the plea withdrawal statute applies to Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Because Defendant filed his motion in 2010, the State argues that the proper legal standard should be whether he entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily—the standard adopted in 2003—as opposed to the good cause standard in effect when Defendant originally entered his plea in 1985. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (Allen Smith 1982) (requiring showing of good cause), with id. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring showing that plea was not knowing and voluntary).

At ¶ 21.

As a starting point, we “apply the law as it exists at the time of the event regulated by the law in question.” State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 13, 251 P.3d 829; see also State v. Johnson, 2012 UT 68, ¶ 11, 290 P.3d 21. In this case, determining the “event regulated by the law in question” turns on whether the act of seeking to withdraw a guilty plea, as prescribed under the plea withdrawal statute, affects a party’s substantive or procedural rights. See Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 14.

The difference is in the nature of the underlying occurrence at issue. On matters of substance the parties’ primary rights and duties are dictated by the law in effect at the time of their underlying primary conduct (e.g., the conduct giving rise to a criminal charge or civil claim). When it comes to the parties’ procedural rights and responsibilities, however, the relevant underlying conduct is different: the relevant occurrence for such purposes is the underlying procedural act (e.g., filing a motion or seeking an appeal).

Id. Our supreme court has “explained that a procedural statute controls the mode and form of procedure for enforcing the underlying substantive rights and merely affects the judicial machinery available for determining substantive rights.” Johnson, 2012 UT 68, ¶ 12 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “By contrast, substantive statutes enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under this framework, we conclude that the plea withdrawal statute is substantive. When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea, he or she is seeking to restore vested constitutional rights that were previously waived as a consequence of entering into a plea agreement. Such rights include the right to a jury trial, the right against self-incrimination, the right to confront witnesses, and perhaps the right to appeal. Reinstatement of these rights by withdrawing a plea of guilty does “not merely affect[] the judicial machinery available for determining substantive rights,” but also operates as a substantive renewal of vested rights previously forfeited. See id. ¶ 13 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

At ¶¶ 22-23.

Because the plea withdrawal statute affects substantive rights, we conclude that the version of the statute in effect at the time Defendant entered his guilty plea in 1985 governs his plea withdrawal motion.

At ¶ 25.

Merits of Defendant’s Claim

The trial court ruled that Defendant did not present good cause justifying the withdrawal of his guilty plea. As a result, the court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant appeals the court’s ruling on the following three grounds: factual innocence, compliance with rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and ineffective assistance of counsel. He also appeals the court’s denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing.

At ¶ 26.

Factual Innocence

Defendant argues that under State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987), superseded by statute as recognized in State v. Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, 282 P.3d 998, his motion for withdrawal should have been granted because the victims’ recantations constituted “new and indisputably pivotal evidence.” See id. at 1041–42 . . . However, the supreme court noted in State v. Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, 282 P.3d 998, that in Gallegos there was a “complete lack of evidence presented by the prosecution” to refute the victim’s recantation. Id. ¶ 35; see also State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987) . . .  Here, the victims’ recent recantations are contradicted by other evidence.

At ¶ 27.

The trial court “determine[d] that the recent [recantations] and Defendant’s claims of innocence d[id] not present good cause to allow Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, especially in the face of the strong evidence to the contrary.” The court noted that the victims’ recantations were “all typed and notarized statements signed decades after the fact.” . . .

At ¶ 28.

In light of the evidence contradicting the victims’ recantations, the trial court’s detailed review of these and all other available documents, and the resulting prejudice to the State should it wish to try the matter, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion based on his claim of factual innocence.

At ¶ 32.

Compliance with Rule 11(e)

When Defendant entered his plea in 1985, rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure—then codified as part of the Utah Code—outlined the procedures that a trial court was required to follow when accepting a guilty plea. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11(e) (Allen Smith Supp. 1985), with Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). Defendant argues that the judge who accepted and entered his guilty plea did not comply with subsections (2), (3), and (4) of rule 11(e). See Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11(e)(2)–(4). Specifically, Defendant argues that the judge failed to ask him what facts he was pleading guilty to, failed to ascertain whether he understood the relationship between the facts and the law, and failed to fully inform him of his rights. Defendant asserts that these alleged rule 11(e) violations now present good cause for withdrawal of his guilty plea.

At ¶ 33.

Prior to the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), a trial court was required to substantially comply with the factors set forth in rule 11(e) before accepting a guilty plea.  See State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Utah 1991) . . . We therefore apply the “substantial compliance” standard to Defendant’s plea. This means that so long as “the record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the defendant entered his [or her] plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences and of the rights he [or she] was waiving,” the plea may not be withdrawn. State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 806 (Utah 1993) (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea under the substantial compliance standard, there must have been “a significant departure from Rule 11 requirements which [leads] to considerable doubt as to whether a defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary.” Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1125. “The determination of whether there was substantial compliance with Rule 11 must necessarily turn on the facts of each case.” Id.

At ¶ 34.

Based upon our review of the record as a whole, or at least what remains of the record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion. The plea-taking court’s minutes indicate that Defendant “was brought before the court and the court advised him of his rights and the consequences of entering such a plea and that the court is not bound by any plea bargaining between [Defendant] and the State”; “[t]he Amended charge [was] read to [D]efendant”; “[t]he court [was] of the opinion that [D]efendant fully [understood] the consequences” of his plea “and the amendment as indicated [was] approved”; “the court [found that] the plea [was] entered knowingly, willingly and with a full understanding of his rights”; “the previous[] pleas of Not Guilty [were] allowed to be withdrawn and the plea of Guilty entered”; “the court again advised [Defendant] of his rights”; and perhaps most tellingly, Defendant’s counsel “addressed the court and stated he ha[d] discussed the matter with [Defendant] at length and [Defendant] agree[d] this [was] the best solution to the problem.”

At ¶ 36.

Defendant relies on his and his mother’s affidavits as evidence of the plea‐taking court’s rule 11(e) violations. These two documents, prepared twenty-five years after the fact, must be balanced against the weight of what remains of the trial record, particularly because Defendant has failed to provide a transcript of the plea colloquy. See generally State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 11, 12 P.3d 92 . . . Indeed, Defendant has failed to identify any other document in the record revealing a “significant departure” by the plea‐taking court from the rule 11(e) requirements that would create doubt that Defendant’s plea was anything other than knowing and voluntary. See Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1125. Thus, we agree with the trial court’s assessment that the plea-taking court substantially complied with rule 11(e) in accepting Defendant’s plea of guilty because the surviving record “affirmatively establishes that [D]efendant entered his . . . plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences and of the rights he . . . was waiving.”

At ¶ 38.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a “[d]efendant must first establish that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. ¶ 51 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, a defendant must demonstrate “that counsel’s performance prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability . . . that except for ineffective counsel, the result would have been different.” Id. ¶ 52

At ¶ 40.

[E]ven if counsel’s performance was deficient, it is readily apparent from the record that Defendant suffered no resulting prejudice.

At ¶ 41.

To show prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, the defendant “must convince [us] that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010); see also United States v. Clingman, 288 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that a “mere allegation that [a defendant] would have insisted on trial . . . is ultimately insufficient to entitle him to relief” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). When making this determination, courts “review the strength of the prosecutor’s case as the best evidence of whether a defendant in fact would have changed his plea and insisted on going to trial.” Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 1072 (10th Cir. 2001); see also State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ¶ 86, 152 P.3d 321 (“[I]n determining the effect of the error, we consider the totality of the evidence . . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

At the time Defendant entered his plea, the evidence against him was substantial. On the morning of the trial, the three young victims were prepared to testify in graphic detail regarding Defendant’s sexual abuse. Defendant offers us no reason to believe that the victims’ testimonies would have varied materially from their mutually corroborating police interviews and the preliminary hearing testimony of the two older boys, which testimony was credible enough to establish probable cause to bind Defendant over for trial. Also, the State was prepared to introduce the results of Defendant’s failed polygraph, which was, by agreement, admissible at trial. Had Defendant been convicted on all three counts, he could have faced life in prison. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1(2) (Allen Smith Supp. 1983); id. § 76-5-404.1(3) (Supp. 1984).

Furthermore, Defendant had little evidence to rebut the State’s case at trial other than his own testimony. Defendant’s chances of acquittal would have likely hinged on the jury’s acceptance of his theory that his jealous stepmother fabricated the abuse and pressured the victims into making false allegations. But as the trial court noted, “there are overwhelming reasons to doubt that” theory. For example, the victims had described a cycle of abuse that involved other individuals outside the case and allegations that they sexually abused each other according to Defendant’s instructions. A jury would likely doubt that a mother would have coerced her own children into implicating themselves and others in a cycle of sexual abuse just so she could get rid of an adult stepchild whom she did not have to allow to live in her home. a plea deal. Thus, Defendant cannot establish prejudice and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim necessarily fails.9

In consideration of the totality of the evidence, we determine that Defendant has failed to demonstrate that it would have been rational for him to insist on going to trial as opposed to accepting

At ¶¶ 42-45.

Denial of Evidentiary Hearing

In arguing that the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing, Defendant primarily relies on Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and State v. Humphrey, 2003 UT App 333, 79 P.3d 960. In Summers, we observed that regardless of whether a defendant attacks a guilty plea directly through a motion to withdraw or collaterally, “an evidentiary hearing must ordinarily be held unless the record of a prior hearing shows petitioner is clearly not entitled to relief.” 759 P.2d at 344–45. Here, even though no record of a prior evidentiary hearing exists, the trial court had access to Defendant’s numerous affidavits and other exhibits. In the court’s view, this documentary evidence accomplished the same purpose as would an evidentiary hearing. Based on that information, the court determined that Defendant was clearly not entitled to relief. In Humphrey, we remanded because “the record [was] unclear as to whether the court made the necessary credibility assessment and factual determinations . . . to support its ruling on [the defendant’s] motion to withdraw his plea.” 2003 UT App 333, ¶¶ 11, 13. In this case, the trial court’s written ruling adequately details its factual determinations and credibility assessments of the key witnesses involved, including Defendant, Defendant’s mother, and the victims.

 Moreover, Defendant does not identify what additional evidence he would have presented had he been afforded an evidentiary hearing. For example, the State correctly notes that Defendant “never explains what additional factual assertions his victims might have made on the stand, nor does he offer any reason why they were prevented from making those assertions in their affidavits.” Defendant also fails to identify any additional witnesses that he may have called or explain why those witnesses did not submit affidavits. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea without an evidentiary hearing.

At ¶¶ 48-49.

Johnson v. Montoya, 2013 UT App 199, No. 20120223-CA (August 8, 2013)

ISSUE: Expert Testimony; Foundation; Methodology; Use of General Statistics

Judge Orme,

Luz Montoya appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting certain expert testimony. We affirm.

At ¶ 1.

The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Witnesses qualified as experts may testify “in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Utah R. Evid. 702(a). For an expert’s testimony to be admissible, there must be a “threshold showing” that the principles or methods forming the basis of the testimony (1) are “reliable,” (2) are “based upon sufficient facts or data,” and (3) “have been reliably applied to the facts.” Id. R. 702(b). This “threshold showing” is met if the principles and methods used and their application to the facts of the case are “generally accepted by the relevant expert community.” Id. R. 702(c). Trial courts perform an “important gatekeeping function” by screening out unreliable expert testimony and ensuring that “only reliable expert testimony will be presented to the jury.” Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power, 2012 UT App 20, ¶ 31, 269 P.3d 980. To that end, trial courts are granted “broad discretion in that role,” and we “will reverse [a trial court’s] decision only when it exceeds the bounds of reasonability.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 122, 299 P.3d 892 (“We review a trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony for an abuse of discretion and find error only if no reasonable person would take the view the trial court adopted.”).

At ¶ 8.

Montoya argues that because the vocational expert “never testified that her methodology was subject to peer review, and never addressed whether there was any known potential rate of error,” her methodology “lacked the foundational requirements to ensure that her opinions had a reasonable degree of certainty.” Montoya, however, misstates the standard that an expert’s methodology must meet for admissibility. The Utah Rules of Evidence do not require expert testimony to exhibit a “reasonable degree of certainty” to be admissible but only a “threshold showing” of reliability Utah R. Evid. 702(b). This threshold requirement “requires only a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability.” Id. R. 702 advisory committee note.

At ¶ 10.

In the context of its evaluation of the vocational expert’s credentials and experience, we cannot say that the trial court exceeded “the bounds of reasonability,” see Gunn Hill, 2012 UT App 20, ¶ 31, by determining that the questionnaires developed by the vocational expert to assess a client’s functionality and the responses Johnson provided were supported by a “basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability,” see Utah R. Evid. 702 advisory committee note, particularly when the results of the questionnaires are supported by other evidence.

At ¶ 11.

Montoya also takes issue with the vocational expert’s reliance on statistics gathered through the American Community Survey1 and the Current Population Survey.2 While she does not appear to challenge the reliability or validity of the two surveys themselves, Montoya essentially argues that there was an insufficient showing that the vocational expert’s use of these surveys in formulating opinions is a reliable and generally accepted methodology in the field of vocational rehabilitation. We disagree.

The vocational expert testified that she knows “numerous individuals in [her] profession that use this data to help persons understand the impact of functional limitation or disability on their ability to get a job” and that these surveys are “the source of employment experiences of persons in the United States. There isn’t any other—there’s not any other source.” (Emphasis in transcript.) She also testified that in addition to being the sole source of the statistics that the federal government routinely relies on, the surveys are the “primary sources that [vocational experts] use” in making determinations about “not only employment experience, but also wages and how long a person stays in the work force.” We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the vocational expert’s testimony because there was a “threshold showing” that her use of the surveys as part of her methodology was reliable and generally accepted in her field.

At ¶¶ 12-13.

Given Johnson’s testimony, we cannot conclude that “no reasonable person would take the view the trial court adopted,” see State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 122, 299 P.3d 892, when it permitted the vocational expert’s testimony, based in part on her conclusion that Johnson had serious difficulty walking up stairs, rather than striking it for lack of foundation.

At ¶ 15.

A majority of justices in Barzee apparently agreed that general statistics cannot be used in isolation and without regard to information specific to the relevant individual. See id. ¶¶ 91–93 (opinion by Durrant, J.). The majority did conclude, however, that because the State’s experts used general statistics in combination with their own first-hand knowledge to support their conclusions, the testimony was admissible. Id. ¶ 92 (“Futhermore, we conclude that the State’s experts did not disregard [the defendant’s] particular case, although it is true that they relied on federal and state statistics taken from general hospital populations.”). We believe the same analysis applies here

While statistics more narrowly tailored to Johnson’s specific field of work, capabilities, location, injuries, and functional limitations may have made the vocational expert’s testimony all the more reliable, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted testimony based only in part on general statistics from the American Community Survey and current Population Survey. [The Court reviews the experts rationale for utilizing the general statistics and the expert’s explanation of how they were relevant]. . . . We conclude that the vocational expert did not rely on general statistics in isolation, and thus, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there were sufficient “indicia of reliability” to make a threshold showing that the expert’s methodology was reliably applied to the facts. See Utah R. Evid. 702 advisory committee note.

At ¶ 16-17.

State v. Melendrez, 2013 UT App 200 No. 20120610-CA (August 8, 2013)

ISSUE: Consecutive Sentencing

Per Curiam,

Victor Melendrez appeals the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences in two felony cases. We affirm.

At ¶ 1.

Melendrez argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences because the trial court did not explicitly consider Melendrez’s rehabilitative needs at sentencing. In determining whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, “the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-3- 401(2) (LexisNexis 2012). Melendrez asserts that the trial court’s brief pronouncement that the sentences in the two cases would run consecutively indicates that the trial court did not consider all of the statutory factors. We disagree.

At ¶ 3.

“[A]s a general rule, we presume that the district court made all the necessary considerations when making a sentencing decision.” State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ¶ 35, 282 P.3d 985. “A sentencing judge is not required to articulate what information [he] considers in imposing a sentence.” Id. ¶ 40. Accordingly, this court “will not assume that the trial court’s silence, by itself, presupposes that the court did not consider the proper factors as required by law.” State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ¶ 11, 40 P.3d 626.

At ¶ 4.

Here, the trial court had the benefit of a presentence report (PSI) containing information regarding Melendrez’s criminal and personal history, his supervision history, and his drug use and mental health history. The report also contained the factual summary of one of the cases and Melendrez’s own statements regarding that criminal episode.1 The PSI contained the recommendation for a prison term for that case. Although Melendrez asserts that the trial court failed to consider that he would benefit from treatment, the information in the PSI indicates that Melendrez minimizes his conduct and responsibility and has a poor history under supervision, along with an extensive criminal history. Given the information in the PSI, it is reasonable to assume that the trial court considered all the statutory factors in sentencing Melendrez. Accordingly, Melendrez has not shown any abuse of discretion by the trial court.

At ¶ 5.