August 27, 2013 Supreme Court Case Summaries

State v. Arriaga-Luna, 2013 UT 56, No. 20110718 (August 27, 2013)

ISSUE: Use of a Suspect’s Children as an Interrogation Technique; Voluntariness of Confession

The State appeals the district court’s grant of defendant Delfino Arriaga-Luna’s motion to suppress his confession to murder. The district court held that this confession was coerced because of the interrogating officers’ “invocation of Mr. Arriaga-Luna’s children as a method to get a confession.” We reverse.

At ¶ 1.

Mr. Arriaga-Luna moved the district court to suppress his confession on the grounds that it was coerced. In ruling on this motion, the court focused its analysis on three aspects of Mr. Arriaga-Luna’s interrogation: (1) the threat of a possible life sentence; (2) the use of the false-friend technique, and (3) references to Mr. Arriaga-Luna’s children. The district court rejected the defense arguments regarding the possible life sentence and the falsefriend technique. However, the district court granted the motion to suppress Mr. Arriaga-Luna’s confession based on “[t]he detectives’ invocation of Mr. Arriaga-Luna’s children as a method to get a confession.” The State appealed this ruling, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).

At ¶ 6.

The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution protect individuals from being compelled to incriminate themselves. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). The ultimate goal of analyzing whether a confession was coerced is to determine “whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne.” United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977).

At ¶ 9.

The totality of the circumstances includes “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ¶ 14, 984 P.2d 1009 (internal quotation marks omitted). Details of the interrogation include external factors, such as “the duration of the interrogation, the persistence of the officers, police trickery, absence of family and counsel, and threats and promises made to the defendant by the officers.” Id. The subjective characteristics of the accused that may affect susceptibility to “more subtle forms of psychological persuasion” include “the defendant’s mental health, mental deficiency, emotional instability, education, age, and familiarity with the judicial system.” Id. ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, for a confession to be involuntary there must be a causal connection between the coercion and the confession. State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah 1993).

At ¶ 10.

Threats or promises render a confession involuntary if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, they overcome a defendant’s free will. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991) . . . For example, we have held that “an interrogation can be impermissibly coercive because [it] carried a threat of greater punishment or a promise for lesser punishment depending on whether [a defendant] confessed.” Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ¶ 29, 984 P.2d 1009 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Police may, however, give a suspect realistic estimates about probable sentences. State v. Montero, 2008 UT App 285, ¶ 14, 191 P.3d 828.

At ¶ 11.

In Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) and United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981), the defendants’ confessions were held to have been coerced because the interrogating officers made threats regarding the defendants’ children. The police officers in Lynumn encircled a single mother and told her that she would not see her children again unless she admitted to being a drug dealer. 372 U.S. at 531–32. The officers also told Lynumn that her children’s government assistance would be withdrawn unless she confessed. Id. at 534. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the threats regarding Lynumn’s children, viewed in light of her lack of experience with criminal law and lack of counsel, overcame her free will and produced an involuntary confession. Id. at 534.

At ¶ 12.

Although we recognize that the intense loyalty and emotion present in most parent-child relationships does provide an opportunity for coercion, we do not adopt any per se rule regarding the effect of references to a defendant’s children on the voluntariness of a confession. The ultimate test in any case involving the voluntariness of a confession is whether the defendant’s will has been overcome under the totality of the circumstances.

At ¶ 14.

We recognize that implicit threats can constitute psychological coercion and overcome a defendant’s free will. However, here, the context of the detective’s statement clarifies that the statements were not implicit threats but rather factual communications that if Mr. Arriaga-Luna implicated his brother and his brother was found to be the sole murderer, Mr. Arriaga-Luna would not “be locked in prison for the rest of [his] life.” Similarly, if the killing were entirely accidental, Mr. Arriaga-Luna would likely be set free. We also note that Mr. Arriaga-Luna did not confess during this interview, which suggests that the officer’s statements did not overcome his free will.

At ¶ 17.

When defendants are concerned for the safety and welfare of their families, law enforcement can inform defendants of public and charitable resources. However, officers should limit themselves to factual statements and not imply that aid for defendants’ families is contingent on a confession. Here, Detective Hamideh strayed close to the line by making a personal offer to help Mr. Arriaga-Luna when he said “I can bring resources.” However, it is clear from the full transcript that the officer made the statement about resources in response to Mr. Arriaga-Luna’s inquiry about what would happen to his daughters, and not in exchange for a confession.

At ¶ 19.

. . . [T]he detective urged him to confess to earn the respect of his daughters.

Such appeals to a defendant’s sense of morality and responsibility are usually non-coercive. See United States v. Miller, . . .

. . . “pointing out such considerations— possibilities over which the police clearly exercise no control—[does not amount] to a threat or promise of the kind pertinent to our inquiry.” Id. Here, as in Prows, Detective Hamideh’s suggestion to Mr. Arriaga-Luna that his daughters would respect him if he told the truth does not constitute a threat or promise because Detective Hamideh was merely appealing to Mr. Arriaga-Luna’s sense of personal dignity and responsibility and speculating about how his daughters may feel about him in the future.

At ¶¶ 20-22.

The totality of the circumstances show that Mr. Arriaga-Luna’s free will was not overborne. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Mr. Arriaga-Luna’s motion to suppress his confession. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

At ¶ ¶ 26.