May 10, 2013, Utah Supreme Court Case Summaries

May 10, 2013

Utah Supreme Court Case

Metropolitan Water v. Sorf,  2013 UT 27, No. 20110443 (May 10, 2013)

ISSUE: Setting Aside a Default Judgment

Justice Parrish,

Petitioner Sorf appeals the denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment. The district court entered a default judgment against Mr. Sorf, awarding the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake and Sandy (District) certain rights over Mr. Sorf’s residential property and enjoining him from making further improvements to his backyard. The district court denied Mr. Sorf’s motion to set aside the default judgment, holding that Mr. Sorf had been properly served and that he had not proffered a meritorious defense. We hold that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to set aside the default judgment without determining whether Mr. Sorf knew that he had been served and was required to file an answer. We also conclude that Mr. Sorf alleged a meritorious defense. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s denial of Mr. Sorf’s motion to set aside the default judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

At ¶ 1.

Facts and background of the case

At ¶¶ 2-10

On review, the court must first decide whether the district court correctly determined that Mr.Sorf did not establish mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect under rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, it must be decided whether there is an alleged meritous defense.

At ¶11

With respect to the first issue, a district court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion to set aside an order or judgment under rule 60(b), and “[t]hus, we review a district court’s denial of a 60(b) motion under an abuse of discretion standard.” Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 54, 150 P.3d 480. But “the court’s discretion is not unlimited.” Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 11, 11 P.3d 277. A district court’s “discretion should be exercised in furtherance of justice and should incline towards granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a hearing” on the merits of his case. Id. ¶ 10. For instance, “if default is issued when a party genuinely is mistaken to a point where, absent such mistake, default would not have occurred, the equity side of the court . . . [should] grant relief.” Id. Based on the equitable nature of the rule, “it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant’s failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it aside.” Id.

At ¶12

A movant is entitled to have a default judgment set aside if  “(1) the  motion is timely; (2) there is a basis for granting relief under one of the subsections of 60(b); and (3) the movant has alleged a meritorious defense.” Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 64, 150 P.3d 480. In this case, timeliness was not at issue. The district court denied Mr. Sorf’s 60(b) motion on the basis that Mr. Sorf did not qualify for relief under 60(b) because he had been properly served with process and did not have a meritorious defense. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Sorf’s rule 60(b) motion for two reasons. First, the relevant inquiry was not whether Mr. Sorf had been properly served, but rather whether Mr.Sorf’s failure to respond was due to his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Second, we find as a matter of law that Mr. Sorf did raise a meritorious defense.

At ¶14

Rule 60(b)(1) provides that a “court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding [because of] . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1).The Court agrees that Mr. Sorf may have qualified for relief under rule 60(b) and remands to the district court for factual findings as to whether Sorf knew a complaint had actually been filed against him.

At ¶15

Service of process was adequate in this case because the process server left the complaint with an adult of reasonable age and discretion who resided at Mr. Sorf’s residence. But the fact that service of process was proper does not end the inquiry because Mr. Sorf could have still been mistaken about whether he had been served or was obligated to file an answer.

At ¶17

“if default is issued when a party genuinely is mistaken to a point where, absent such mistake, default would not have occurred, the equity side of the court would grant relief.” May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984) (per curiam). This is in accordance with the intent of rule 60(b) to ensure that parties are afforded “a full opportunity to present their evidence and contentions as to disputed issues so [that cases] may be disposed of on substantial rather than upon technical grounds.” McKean v. Mountain View Mem’l Estates, Inc., 411 P.2d 129, 130 (Utah 1966).

At ¶18

Here, the district court refused to set aside the default judgment based on its conclusion that Mr. Sorf had been properly served with process. But the district court did not make any factual findings with respect to Mr. Sorf’s claim under rule 60(b)(1) that the default was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and Mr. Sorf’s claim in this regard was sufficient to raise a factual dispute as to the reason he failed to file a timely response to the complaint.

At ¶19

After Sorf’s wife was served at their home, the District contacted Sorf urging him to contact the district to aid them in working out an amicable resolution. These circumstances are sufficient to raise the possibility that Mr. Sorf’s failure to timely respond to the complaint was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Because the district court did not make any factual findings regarding these issues, it erred. We therefore vacate the district court’s order refusing to set aside the default judgment and remand this matter to the district court for a factual determination on this issue.

At ¶¶20-23

Relief from judgment requires a showing of a meritorious defense to a claim.” Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 28, 11 P.3d 277. But this is a low bar, and “a party need not actually prove its proposed defenses to meet this standard.” Id. “The proffer of a meritorious defense under rule 60(b) is subject to a liberal pleading standard analogous to that prescribed under rule 8, which requires only that a party state the basis for its claims or defenses ‘in short and plain terms.’” Judson v. Wheeler RV Las Vegas, L.L.C., 2012 UT 6, ¶ 23, 270 P.3d 456 (quoting UTAH R. CIV. P. 8). Indeed, the purpose of the rule “is simply to prevent the necessity of treating defenses that are frivolous on their face.” Lund, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 29. “Thus, where a party presents a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by the claimant . . . , it has adequately shown a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense for the purposes of its motion to set aside a default judgment.” Id.

At ¶24

Sorf may have had a reasonable mistaken belief that entitled him to relief under rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and he proffered a meritorious defense. We therefore vacate the district court’s denial of Mr. Sorf’s motion to set aside the default judgment and remand for determination of whether Mr. Sorf’s failure to respond to the complaint was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

At ¶26

State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, No. 20110458 (May 10, 2013)

ISSUE: Proof for Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child

Justice Parrish,

Defendant’s conviction was based on the holding that he occupied a “position of special trust in relation to the victim” under Utah Code section 76-5-404.1(4)(h). Because Mr. Watkins was temporarily staying in the spare bedroom of H.C.’s father’s house, the district court and the court of appeals both held that he was an “adult cohabitant of a parent [of the victim].” Id.; State v. Watkins, 2011 UT App 96, ¶ 16, 250 P.3d 1019. The position of “adult cohabitant of a parent” is one of several positions specifically referenced in section 76-5-404.1(4)(h). The question before us is whether Mr. Watkins’s status as an “adult cohabitant” of H.C.’s father was sufficient, as a matter of law, to support the conclusion that he occupied a “position of special trust in relation to [H.C.].”

At ¶ 1

The fact that a defendant occupies one of the positions listed in section 76-5-404.1(4)(h), such as “adult cohabitant of a parent,” is insufficient, standing alone, to aggravate the crime of sexual abuse of a child. Rather, to establish that a defendant occupies a “position of special trust in relation to the victim,” the State must establish that the defendant occupies “a position of authority” in relation to the victim and must further establish that “by reason of that position [the defendant] is able to exercise undue influence over the victim.” Id. § 76-5-404.1(4)(h).

At ¶ 2

The Court reviews the facts of the case.

At ¶ 3–14

Utah Code section 76-5-404.1 articulates the elements of sexual abuse of a child. Under subsection (4)(h), the crime of sexual abuse of a child is aggravated if “the offense was committed by a person who occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim.” UTAH CODE § 76-5-404.1(4)(h) (emphasis added). Subsection (4)(h) states that a

“position of special trust” means that position occupied by a person in a position of authority, who, by reason of that position is able to exercise undue influence over the victim, and includes, but is not limited to, a youth leader or recreational leader who is an adult, adult athletic manager, adult coach, teacher, counselor, religious leader, doctor, employer, foster parent, baby-sitter, adult scout leader, natural parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, legal guardian, grandparent, aunt, uncle, or adult cohabitant of a parent. Id. (emphasis added).

At ¶ 16

“When interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature.” State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, ¶ 8, 52 P.3d 1276 (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, “[w]e first interpret the statute according to its plain language.” Wilcox v. CSX Corp., 2003 UT 21, ¶ 8, 70 P.3d 85. Here, the statute reveals three possibilities as to the legal significance of a finding that a defendant occupied the position of an “adult cohabitant of a parent.” Specifically, the statute raises a question of whether the enumerated positions are “position[s] of special trust” or “position[s] of authority.” UTAH CODE § 76-5-404.1(4)(h). This question leads to three possible interpretations of the statute that impact the elements of the crime of which Mr. Watkins was convicted.

At ¶ 18

The Court discusses the possible interpretations of the statute.

At ¶ 19–21

The statute reads in relevant part: “‘[P]osition of special trust’ means that position occupied by a person in a position of authority, who, by reason of that position is able to exercise undue influence over the victim, and includes, but is not limited to . . . [an] adult cohabitant of a parent.” UTAH CODE § 76-5-404.1(4)(h) (emphasis added).

At ¶ 26

The statutory language clearly states that the list of enumerated positions was meant to include, and not simply to illustrate, positions that are, as a matter of law, “position[s] of authority” or “position[s] of special trust.” Thus, Mr. Watkins’s suggested interpretation that the enumerated positions were not intended to comprise part of the legal definition of an aggravating factor contradicts the plain language of the statute. We therefore reject it.

At ¶ 27

The State’s proposed interpretation equates proof that a defendant occupied an enumerated position with proof that the defendant occupied a “position of special trust.” The State asserts that the Legislature intended that, as a matter of law, a defendant who occupies an enumerated position both (1) occupies a “position of authority” and (2) has the ability to “exercise undue influence.” While we find this to be a plausible interpretation, it is not the only plausible interpretation, and we conclude that the other plausible interpretation is most consistent with the statutory text and legislative history.

At ¶ 28

The plain language of the statute creates an enhanced penalty for perpetrators who both occupied a “position of authority” and had the ability to “exercise undue influence” over their victims. UTAH CODE § 76-5-404.1(4)(h). “[W]e presume that the Legislature used each term advisedly, and we endeavor to] give effect to each term . . . .” Versluis v. Guar. Nat’l. Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992).

At ¶ 30

The State’s proposed interpretation is based on the premise that the final clause of section 76-5-404.1(4)(h), which states that it “includes . . . adult cohabitant of a parent,” modifies the statute’s initial clause. Under the State’s interpretation, the initial clause, which states that “the offense was committed by a person who occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim” is modified by the enumerated list. But these two clauses are separated by two other clauses, one of which states that a “‘position of special trust’ means that position occupied by a person in a position of authority.” UTAH CODE § 76-5-404.1(4)(h). It is also a reasonable interpretation that the enumerated list was intended to modify the clause regarding a “position of authority,” rather than the phrase “position of special trust.” And this interpretation is consistent with the statutory text, inasmuch as positions such as an “adult athletic manager, adult coach, teacher, counselor, religious leader, doctor, [and] employer” are all positions of authority, but not necessarily positions of special trust in which the perpetrator is able to exercise undue influence over the victim.

At ¶ 31

The Court reviewed the legislative history behind the statute.

At ¶ 34–37

The Legislative history coincides with the language of the statute and supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended to aggravate child sexual abuse only in those cases where the perpetrator occupied both a “position of authority” and was “able to exercise undue influence” in relation to the victim. Id.

At ¶ 38

Proof that a defendant occupies one of the enumerated positions under Utah Code section 76-5-404.1(4)(h) suffices to establish only that the defendant occupied a “position of authority.” But for the State to establish aggravated sexual abuse of a child under subsection (4)(h), it must prove both that the defendant occupied a “position of authority” over the victim and that the position gave the defendant the ability to “exercise undue influence” over the victim. Because the lower courts did not require the State to establish both elements, we vacate Mr. Watkins’s conviction and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AT ¶ 39