May 7, 2013
Utah Supreme Court Cases
In
re C.C, 2013 UT 26, No. 20120016 (May 7, 2013)
This case concerns competing petitions to adopt C.C., a five-year-old child. C.C. was removed from his home by the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). After the juvenile court terminated his mother’s parental rights, it faced two competing petitions to adopt him—one from his grandmother and the other from his foster parents. The court consolidated the competing petitions, granted procedural priority to the foster parents, and dismissed the grandmother’s petition without first holding a hearing to consider the merits of her petition. We must decide whether the juvenile court properly handled these competing petitions.We conclude that the juvenile court erred when it gave priority to the foster parents’ petition and dismissed the grandmother’s petition without considering its merits. In order to properly determine the best interests of children placed for adoption, courts must hold a hearing and consider the merits of each competing adoption petition.
At ¶¶ 1-2.
On appeal, Grandmother argues that the juvenile court
erred in denying a hearing on the merits of her Petition for Relief, granting
priority to Foster Parents’ adoption petition, and denying her notice and an
opportunity to appear at Foster Parents’ adoption hearing. She also claims the
court erred by denying her Motion to Intervene in the State’s Termination Case.
These claims present questions of statutory interpretation and also require us
to determine whether the juvenile court applied correct legal standards, all of
which are reviewed for correctness.2 Finally,
she argues that, if we remand the case, the juvenile judge should be
disqualified. We review this claim for correctness.
At ¶ 12.
The
Court devotes a large portion of its opinion reviewing the record below to
determine if Grandmother preserved the issues she now appeals. It determines: (1) Grandmother Preserved Her
Claim that She Was Entitled to a Hearing on the Merits of Her Petition for
Relief; (2) Grandmother May Argue on Appeal that In re Adoption of A.B. is
Contrary to the “Best Interests of the Child” Standard, Even Though She Did not
Cite the Case in Her Arguments to the Juvenile Court; (3) Grandmother Preserved
Her Claim that She Was Entitled to Notice and an Opportunity to Participate at
Foster Parents’ Adoption Hearing, but it is Unnecessary to Reach This Issue on
Appeal; (4) Grandmother Failed to Preserve Her Claim that DCFS Has an Ongoing
Duty to Evaluate Relatives for C.C.’s Placement; and (5) Grandmother is Free to
Comply with Rule 63(b) and Assert Her Claim of Judicial Bias Upon Remand.
At ¶¶
13-30.
In its December 22 order, the juvenile court granted
procedural preference to Foster Parents and ordered an evidentiary hearing on
their petition. The court stated that it would consider Grandmother’s competing
petition only if it denied Foster Parent’s petition. Because the court later
granted Foster Parents’ petition, it dismissed Grandmother’s competing petition
without addressing its merits. Grandmother contends that this process of
prioritizing one adoption petition over another is improper because it violates
the Adoption Act’s mandate that the best interests of the child should control. She argues that “if more than one
legitimately interested party wishes to adopt a child, it is impossible for the
Juvenile Court to fully and fairly determine the best outcome without
conducting a full evidentiary hearing on the respective merits of both.” We agree.
At ¶
31.
In light of [In re Adoption of A.B. and Adoption
of J.N.], it is unclear what duty, if any, a court has to a party who files
a competing adoption petition. We now take the opportunity to clarify the law
on this important issue. We recognize
at the outset that, although the Adoption Act is silent on the issue of
competing petitions, it nevertheless offers guiding principles that direct our
decision of this issue. Foremost of these principles is that we must hold the
child’s best interests paramount: “[i]t is the intent and desire of the
Legislature that in every adoption the best interest of the child should govern
and be of foremost concern in the court’s determination.”
Further, the Adoption Act directs that “the rights
and interests of all parties affected by an adoption proceeding must be
considered and balanced in determining what constitutional protections and
processes are necessary and appropriate.” Finally, the Adoption Act states that
“the state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes
for adoptive children in a prompt manner, [and] in preventing the disruption of
adoptive placements.”
Based on these principles, we conclude that courts
must conduct a hearing on the merits of competing adoption petitions. The
prioritization process established by the court of appeals, and followed here
by the juvenile court, allows for prioritization of one adoption petition over
another on grounds potentially unrelated to the best interests of the child.
This process is therefore inconsistent with the legislative directives in the
Adoption Act.
At ¶¶
37-39.
. . . We . . .stress that our opinion today does not prevent courts from
moving forward with an adoption petition that is timely, compliant with the
law, and appears to be in the best interests of the child. We simply conclude
that it is in the best interests of children placed for adoption to give
competing petitioners a chance to assert their interests.
To this end, courts are free to consolidate adoption
petitions pursuant to rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and hold a joint evidentiary hearing
to consider the relative merits of competing petitions. Or, in their
discretion, courts may instead decide to consider the petitions separately
when, for example, privacy is a concern. Further, timeliness is still a
relevant factor in a court’s decision to grant one petition over another. A
court may take note, for example, of a competing petition’s level of statutory
compliance and its timeliness relative to the first petition’s stage of
advancement toward an ultimate award of adoption. But the court’s decision to
grant one petition over another must also rest on the relative merits of the
competing petitions as they relate to the best interests of the child. Such a decision
can only be made after conducting a hearing on the merits for each competing
petition. Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court erred in
prioritizing Foster Parent’s adoption petition and dismissing Grandmother’s
petition without first holding a hearing on its merits.
At ¶¶
43-44.
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