May 3, 2013 Utah Supreme Court Case Summaries

May 3, 2013

Utah Supreme Court Cases

State v. Miguel Mateos-Martinez, 2013 UT 23 No. 20110431 (May 3, 2013)

ISSUE: Uniform Operation of the Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution; Victim Witness Impact Statements at Sentencing

Justice Durham,

Miguel Mateos-Martinez appeals his conviction and sentence of life without parole on a charge of aggravated murder. He argues that the prosecution’s decision to charge him with aggravated murder and the district court’s denial of his motion to amend the charge to murder violated his constitutional rights. He also argues that the aggravated murder statute unconstitutionally provides prosecutors with unbridled discretion to make charging decisions. Finally, he argues that the admission of victim impact testimony at his sentencing hearing violated his constitutional rights. We affirm.

At ¶1

Background and facts of the case

At ¶2-5

Denial of Motion to Amend the Charge

. . . First, [Defendant] argues that the charging decision violated both the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Second, he argues that the aggravated murder statute unconstitutionally affords prosecutors unbridled discretion to charge persons in his situation with aggravated murder.

At ¶ 8.

Uniform Operation of the Laws

“All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.” UTAH CONST. art. I, § 24. To determine whether a statute meets this requirement, we apply a three-part test. We ask “(1) whether the tatute creates any classifications; (2) whether the classifications impose any disparate treatment on persons similarly situated; and (3) if there is disparate treatment, whether the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.” State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30, ¶ 17, 254 P.3d 183.

At ¶9

Mr. Mateos-Martinez argues that the decision to charge him with aggravated murder was “a case of over-prosecution against people in his class.” To support this argument, he offers a list of eight other criminal defendants represented by the Salt Lake City Legal Defender Assocation. These defendants were apparently all charged with both murder and aggravated robbery, but in their cases the aggravated robbery charges were not used to increase the charge of murder to aggravated murder, as was done in Mr. Mateos-Martinez’s case.

At ¶10

Mr. Mateos-Martinez concedes that this list is not “a complete record of all relevant prosecutions in the state.” We need not determine whether it is even a representative record, however, because on its face the list fails to provide sufficient information about these other defendants for us to determine whether they are “persons similarly situated” to Mr. Mateos-Martinez—a requirement for any claim that the uniform operation of laws clause has been violated. The list provides only the names, case numbers, and races of the other defendants.  We cannot tell whether they were charged, as was Mr. Mateos-Martinez, with multiple counts of aggravated robbery and with multiple other aggravated felonies. Further, we know nothing about the circumstances surrounding their crimes, and cannot determine their relative culpability, or discern what other factors may have informed the prosecutorial decision not to charge them with aggravated murder.

. . . Mr. Mateos-Martinez has not shown that the decision to charge him with aggravated murder “impose[d] any disparate treatment” on him, Robinson, 2011 UT 30, ¶ 17. He therefore cannot show that the charging decision violated the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause. For the same reason, he has not shown a violation of the federal Constitution.

At ¶¶11-12

Unbridled Discretion

Mr. Mateos-Martinez argues in the alternative that the aggravated murder statute is unconstitutional on its face because it “offers prosecutors . . . unbridled discretion to choose arbitrarily whether to file charges as aggravated murder (carrying as penalties capital punishment and life without parole) or as murder (carrying lower penalties).”

At ¶13

 Section 76-5-202(1) of the Utah Code provides that “[c]riminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another [and] . . . the homicide was committed incident to an act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which the actor committed or attempted to commit aggravated robbery.” Citing State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995), Mr. Mateos-Martinez argues that this statute violates the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause because it does not constrain the prosecution’s discretion to charge a defendant with aggravated murder.

At ¶14

The court distinguishes this case from State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995) and determines that “aggravated murder is a different crime than murder, with an additional element that must

be proved at trial. We reject Mr. Mateos-Martinez’s argument, and affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to amend the charge.”

At ¶¶ 15-17.

Admission of Victim Witness Impact Testimony

Mr. Mateos-Martinez argues that the admission of nflammatory victim impact statements at his sentencing hearing violated the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments located in article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.3

At ¶ 18.

“[T]he Eighth Amendment does not bar, per se, victim impact evidence, but victim impact evidence may be inadmissible if the evidence is so prejudicial that it makes sentencing fundamentally unfair under the Due Process Clause.” State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ¶ 25, 247 P.3d 344 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823, 827 (1991)). Further, “evidence that addresses the defendant’s character or expresses the victim’s opinion of the appropriate sentence at the penalty phase of trial is inadmissible under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2).

Payne overturned Booth v. Maryland, which held the Eighth Amendment barred victim impact evidence. However, to the extent Payne overruled Booth, Booth retained viability for its holding that victim impact evidence that addresses the defendant’s character or expresses the victim’s opinion of the appropriate sentence at the penalty phase of trial is inadmissible under the Eighth Amendment.

Id.

At ¶ 19.

Both Payne and Booth limit their holdings to capital sentencing proceedings. . . . .

At ¶ 20..

. . . Today we hold that the Eighth Amendment doctrine of Payne, which establishes an absolute bar on certain types of victim impact testimony, does not apply to sentencing proceedings where death is not an option.

At ¶ 24.

The court distinguishes the present case from Ott stating:

. . . The criminal code has since been amended, and now defines aggravated murder as a “capital felony” only if the state has filed “a notice of intent to seek the death penalty.” . . . Therefore, while Mr. Ott’s sentencing proceeding was treated as “capital” even though death was never “on the table,” Mr. Mateos-Martinez is clearly not eligible for such treatment.

And

. . . the sentencing decision in [Ott]—a choice between LWOP and a lesser sentence—was made by a jury. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ¶ 10. But the same bill that amended the aggravated murder statute created a new statutory section in the sentencing chapter of the criminal code. Aggravated Murder Amendments, ch. 275, §§ 2, 3, 2007 Utah Laws 1152–53. This section provides that “[a] person who has pled guilty to or been convicted of first degree felony aggravated murder under Section 76-5-202 shall be sentenced by the court. . . . The sentence under this section shall be life in prison without parole or an indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years and which may be for life.” UTAH CODE § 76-3-207.7(1)–(2).

At ¶¶ 25-28.

. . . the Eighth Amendment’s absolute ban on victim impact evidence that addresses the defendant’s character or expresses the victim’s character or expresses the victim’s opinion of the appropriate sentence . . .  does not apply to Mr. Mateos-Martinez’s sentencing proceeding.

At ¶ 29.

Our reluctance to extend the Eighth Amendment per se ban to noncapital proceedings is strengthened by the fact that Mr. Mateos-Martinez was sentenced by a judge. “A sentencing judge is not required to articulate whether specific information was inappropriate for consideration, and the mere introduction of potentially improper information is not sufficient to establish reliance.” State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ¶ 40, 282. Judges “are presumably conditioned by education, training and experience to render service of a professional character under a discipline which should involve a high degree of integrity.” . . .

At ¶ 31.

We therefore hold that there is no Eighth Amendment bar to certain types of victim impact testimony in noncapital, adult sentencing proceedings before a judge. Further, it does not appear to us that the Eighth Amendment speaks at all to the use of such testimony in such cases.

At ¶ 32.

ASC Utah v. Wolf Mountain, 2013 UT 24, No. 20110431 (May 3, 2013)

ISSUE: Mootness; JNOV, Motions for New Trial, Motions to Amend Complaint; Remittitur

Justice Durham,

Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. (Wolf Mountain) appeals a judgment arguing that the district court committed reversible error when it denied Wolf Mountain’s motions for summary judgment, determined that the Amended and Restated Development Agreement for the Canyons Specially Planned Area (SPA Agreement) is ambiguous, and denied Wolf Mountain’s motions for post-judgment relief. ASCU argues that the entire appeal is moot because it purchased Wolf Mountain’s appellate rights in this case We determine that ASCU did not acquire Wolf Mountain’s appellate rights and that the appeal is therefore not moot. We then consider the merits of Wolf Mountain’s appeal and affirm.

At  ¶ 1.

Mootness

. . . Because Wolf Mountain did not appeal from the Writ of Execution, the court does not review the execution proceedings or orders. See Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, ¶ 50, 993 P.2d 191. Rather, the court seeks to interpret the language of the Writ of Execution and the Certificate of Sale to determine what effect, if any, the sale had on Wolf Mountain’s appellate rights.

At ¶ 7.

The Court interprets the contract and

agrees with Wolf Mountain that the term “claim” refers to a demand for affirmative relief, as opposed to a defense or a right to appeal. Thus, the term “[c]laims” in the Certificate of Sale did not encompass Wolf Mountain’s appellate rights in this case. Accordingly, the court need not determine whether, in the case of a certificate of sale that unambiguously purported to transfer appellate rights, Utah public policy would prevent a judgment creditor from executing on a judgment debtor’s right to appeal.

At ¶¶ 8-9.

Having established that an actual controversy exists, the court turns to the merits of the appeal. Wolf Mountain argues that the district court erred when it denied Wolf Mountain’s motions for summary judgment, ruled that section 3.2.6 of the SPA Agreement is ambiguous, and denied Wolf Mountain’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and its motion in the alternative for a new trial and for remittitur. We affirm.

At ¶ 10.

Motion for SJ

Wolf Mountain filed three motions for summary judgment based on asserted facts about conveyance of land that  it alleged to be undisputed. The district court ruled that summary judgment was not appropriate because there remained factual disputes that the jury needed to resolve.

At ¶ 11.

Generally, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable on appeal because the movant has had “the opportunity to fully litigate [at trial] the issues raised in the summary judgment motion[].” Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, ¶ 19, 144 P.3d 1147. Appellate review is available only when a motion for summary judgment is denied on a purely legal basis. Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2009 UT 44, ¶ 15, 215 P.3d 152.

At ¶ 12.

The Court determines that there were remaining questions of fact and appellate review is not available.

At ¶ 13.

Ambiguity

The Court refuses to review Wolf Mountains legal challenge to the trial court’s finding that section 3.2.6 of the SPA Agreement (Section 3.2.6) is ambiguous because the matter was not adequately briefed.

At ¶¶ 14-16.

Motion for JNOV

Wolf Mountain argues that the district court erred in denying its JNOV motion under URCP 50(b). Because “[i]t is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence,” Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998). A jury verdict “should not be regarded lightly nor overturned without good and sufficient reason,” Bowden v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 286 P.2d 240, 244 (Utah 1955). Accordingly, a district court may grant a JNOV motion only if there is no “basis in the evidence, including reasonable inferences which could be drawn therefrom, to support the jury’s determination.” Braithwaite v. W. Valley City Corp., 921 P.2d 997, 999. We review rulings on JNOV motions for correctness. Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah 1996).

At ¶18

Under these standards, Wolf Mountain’s burden on appeal was to demonstrate that there was no basis in the evidence to support the jury’s verdict.  Wolf Mountain should have marshaled the evidence in compliance with Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) and then explained why the evidence supporting the verdict was insufficient. Because Wolf Mountain has failed to carry its burden on appeal, we affirm the district court’s denial of the JNOV motion.

At ¶ 19.

Motion for New Trial

A motion for a new trial “invokes the sound discretion of the trial court, and appellate review of its ruling is quite limited.” Davis v. Grand Cnty. Serv. Area, 905 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, ¶ 8, 135 P.3d 861. We will reverse a district court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial “only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision.” Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991). District courts are required to explain the basis for their decisions only when they grant motions for a new trial—not when they deny such motions. . . .

At ¶ 21.

The district judge who presided over a trial is in a far better position than an appellate court to determine, whether the evidence was sufficient to justify the verdict or whether the jury awarded damages “under the influence of passion or prejudice.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(a)(5)–(6). . . . We are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in denying Wolf Mountain’s motion for a new trial on the grounds of insufficient evidence or of passion or prejudice.

At ¶ 22.

In contrast, the district court is not necessarily in a better position than an appellate court to identify its own errors of law. Manzanares v. Byington (In re Adoption of Baby B.), 2012 UT 35, ¶ 41,__ P.3d __. Thus, we review an appellant’s allegations of legal error under URCP 59(a)(7) for correctness. See id. However, we will reverse and order a new trial only if we (1) identify a legal error that would be grounds for a new trial under URCP 59(a)(7) and (2) determine that the error “resulted in prejudice necessitating a new trial.” Gbur v. Golio, 932 A.2d 203, 207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), aff’d, 963 A.2d 443 (Pa. 2009).

At ¶ 23.

Here, Wolf Mountain alleges that the district court erred in three ways: (1) by holding that the SPA Agreement was ambiguous, (2) by allowing ASCU to amend its complaint in the middle of trial, and (3) by making several erroneous evidentiary rulings.

At ¶ 24.

Motion to Amend

Wolf Mountain’s second allegation is incorrectly labeled as a claim of legal error. It is actually a claim of abuse of discretion because district courts have discretion to allow parties to amend their pleadings “when justice so requires.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 15(a). An abuse of discretion may be grounds for a new trial if it deprived a party of a fair trial. UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1). However, even if Wolf Mountain had correctly made this argument under URCP 59(a)(1), it would fail because the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing ASCU to amend its complaint.

At ¶ 25.

In ruling on a motion to amend, district courts must weigh “(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification for delay; and (3) any resulting prejudice to the responding party.” Savage v. Utah Youth Vill., 2004 UT 102, ¶ 9, 104 P.3d 1242.  [The court outlines the facts surrounding the motion and determines that] . . . The district court properly considered the timeliness of and justification for ASCU’s motion to amend and the possible prejudice to Wolf Mountain. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the motion.

At ¶ 26.

Evidentiary Rulings

Wolf Mountain alleges several erroneous evidentiary rulings. The Court denies appellate review on most of the rulings because these arguments were inadequately briefed.

At ¶ 27.

The court does review stipulation for admission and rules that the district court did not err in excluding the document. one evidentiary issue involving the exclusion of a document pertaining to ASCU’s development plans.  The court reviews the foundation testimony, and the evidence regarding a purported

At ¶ 28.

Remittitur

. . . Where a district court has appropriately determined that a new trial is not warranted, there are no grounds for remittitur. Thus, in light of our conclusion that the district court appropriately denied Wolf Mountain’s motion for a new trial, see supra ¶ 28, the court did not err in denying Wolf Mountain’s request for remittitur.

At ¶ 29.

Schroeder Investments, L.C., v. Edwards, 23 UT 25, No. 20110910 (May 3, 2013)

ISSUE: Condemnation and the Compatible Use Doctrine

Justice Lee,

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) owns a piece of property used as a detention pond in Provo, on land adjacent to property owned by Schroeder Investments. Schroeder filed a condemnation action, asserting a right to condemn a portion of UDOT’s parcel to construct an access road to the development Schroeder planned to build on its property.

UDOT moved for summary judgment. It invoked the “more necessary public use” provision of the eminent domain statute, which provides that property “already appropriated to some public use” may not be appropriated for another unless the second public use is “more necessary.” UTAH CODE § 78B-6- 504(1)(d). Schroeder conceded that UDOT’s pond was more necessary than its proposed road. But it sought to invoke an exception to the more necessary public use requirement—a so-called doctrine of “compatible uses,” which purportedly allowed the condemnation if the pond and proposed road could coexist. The district court granted summary judgment for UDOT, finding that the uses were incompatible because UDOT’s pond left no room for Schroeder’s proposed road.

On appeal, Schroeder challenges the district court’s invocation of the more necessary public use doctrine and its refusal to allow an exception under the doctrine of compatible uses. We affirm. Schroeder’s version of the compatible use exception is unsupported by our relevant caselaw and incompatible with our eminent domain statute, which leave room for an exception only where property has not yet been dedicated fully to another public use.

At ¶¶ 1-3.

Background and facts of the case are given

At ¶¶2-9.

Under Schroeder’s version of this exception, there was no need to determine whether a proposed or existing use was “more necessary” where both uses could peacefully coexist. And although UDOT’s detention pond occupied its entire property (other than Schroeder’s existing easement), leaving no room for Schroeder’s proposed use, Schroeder claimed that the detention pond and its proposed road were still compatible because UDOT could modify its detention pond by moving it so that it would partially occupy a piece of Schroeder’s adjoining parcel. Schroeder offered to donate this adjoining property to UDOT and also to compensate it for the cost of modifying the detention pond.

At ¶ 8.

Schroeder Investments finds fault in the district court’s rejection of its version of the compatible use exception. Under Schroeder’s version, two uses are treated as compatible if they can coexist—even if the first use occupies the property in full, and even if a condition of their coexistence is payment of compensation.  We disagree and accordingly affirm. Schroeder’s broad, compensation-based formulation of the compatible use exception is unsupported by our caselaw and also runs afoul of the governing statute.

At ¶10

The court distinguishes the present case from the reasoning in Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consolidated Mines Co., 174 P. 172 (Utah 1918), and Postal Telegraph Cable Co. of Utah v. Oregon Short-Line Railroad Co., 65 P. 735 (Utah 1901) from Schroeder’s formulation of the compatible use exception. In each of these two cases, the condemned property was not being used to its full capacity. And “it was this point, not the broad compensation-based principle identified by Schroeder, that supported our conclusion in these cases that the proposed and existing uses were compatible. More importantly, it is this same narrow distinction—not the principle of compensation—that allows the “compatible use” exception articulated by those cases to be reconciled with the eminent domain statute’s “more necessary public use” requirement, see UTAH CODE § 78B-6-504(1)(d).

At ¶11-20

Schroeder seeks to recast these cases in a different light. In Schroeder’s view, these cases authorize condemnation whenever the condemner is willing and able to compensate the property owner for modifications necessary to make the uses compatible. The court is not persuaded.

At ¶15

While Postal Telegraph mentions compensation, that mention had nothing to do with the sort of compensation Schroeder has in mind. In Postal Telegraph, the proposed use of the property (for telegraph lines) was not the type of use that would interfere at all with the existing use of the property (for the railroad right of way). 65 P. at 737–39. The right of way for the railroad was, after all, 100-feet wide, and the railway was placed in the middle of the right of way. This left substantial room on either side of the track. Id. 

At ¶16

Thus, while we noted that the telegraph company was required to provide “just compensation,” id. at 739, the compensation in question was not a condition or element of a showing of compatible use. It was simply a reflection of the constitutional requirement of just compensation for taking a piece of the railroad’s right of way. This is not the type of compensation Schroeder has in mind—compensation for modifying an existing public use—and Postal Telegraph is accordingly of no benefit to Schroeder’s position.

At ¶ 18.

[I]n Monetaire Mining we were required to reconcile (a) specific statutory language clearly contemplating some use in common of mining tunnels with (b) the general more necessary public use requirement. Any suggestion that compensation might substitute for true compatibility accordingly resulted from the need to give “all . . . provisions of our statute . . . a fair and reasonable application and effect.” Id.  Schroeder, however, cannot point to any specific statute suggesting that a road and detention pond should be permitted to coexist. Thus, neither of the governing cases support Schroeder’s view that incompatible uses generally can be made compatible by the payment of compensation. Nor could they in light of the clear terms of the eminent domain statute—terms we are not free to override through our caselaw.

At ¶ 20.

. . . [T]he statute leaves no room for a version of the exception that would permit a taking even where a parcel had already been appropriated in its entirety—the excep-ion Schroeder advances—because the statute nowhere suggests that compensation is an alternative to compliance with the “more necessary public use” requirement.

At ¶ 22.

Even if our caselaw did sanction the broad exception sought by Schroeder, we would have no choice but to repudiate it. In a case like this one where the statute speaks directly to the issue before us, the statute is supreme. See I.M.L. v. State, 2002 UT 110, ¶ 25, 61 P.3d 1038 . . .  And in such a case, our judicial role is secondary (interpretation), not primary (policymaking). See Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994) . . . .Our interpretation may not exceed the statutory bounds set by the legislature.

        

At ¶ 23

. . . Schroeder’s policy arguments falter on their own terms, as they fail to account for an important, countervailing consideration. One of the primary policies underlying the “more necessary public use” provision is the avoidance of serial takings. See, e.g., Greater Clark Cnty. Sch. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Co., Ind., Inc., 385 N.E.2d 952, 954 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (“[A]bsent the prior public use rule, the land could be condemned back and forth indefinitely.”). Yet Schroeder’s compensation-based version of the compatible use exception opens a wide door to serial takings. Under Schroeder’s view, a subsequent taking would always be sustained—so long as the condemner is willing to pay compensation for necessary modifications to an existing use.

At ¶ 26.

The version of the compatible use exception supported by our caselaw (allowing only the taking of unused property), on the other hand, is subject to an inherent limitation on serial takings: Once property is dedicated to one public use, it can be taken again only if the subsequent public use is more necessary than the first. Schroeder’s condemnation runs afoul of this principle, and we accordingly reject it.

At ¶ 27.