Utah
Court of Appeals Case Summaries
May 31, 2013
Friedman
v. Salt Lake County, 2013 UT App 137, No. 20110870-CA (May 31, 2013)
ISSUE:
Due Process, Involuntary Servitude, Sufficiency of Pleadings regarding
Constitutional Challenges Concerning Violation of the Free Exercise Clause
Judge
Christiansen,
Charles D.
Friedman appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his constitutional claims
against Salt Lake County (the County). We affirm.
At ¶
1.
In May 2009, Friedman was a federal prisoner being held at the Salt Lake
County Adult Detention Center (the Detention Center).2 On Saturday, May 9, 2009, during Friedman’s recreation hour, a
jail officer instructed Friedman to clean writing from his cell wall and
Friedman refused. Friedman is Jewish and, accordingly, observes Saturday as his
Sabbath. Jewish tenets require that he perform no work on Saturdays. While
declining to clean his wall may have been consistent with his religious
beliefs, Friedman’s refusal to follow the officer’s order constituted a violation
of the Detention Center’s rules. As a result, the officer filed a Prisoner violation Report and terminated the
remainder of Friedman’s recreation hour. Friedman filed two Prisoner Grievance
Forms, requesting a written apology and claiming that the officer violated his
constitutional right to the free exercise of his religion and his right to
refuse forced labor. Friedman’s requests for relief were denied. In response to
Friedman’s Prisoner Grievance Forms, the prison officials explained that it was
a jail rule that he clean his cell every day. On May 11, 2009, a Prisoner
Disciplinary Hearing Disposition held that Friedman was in violation of
prisoner rules and regulations. Friedman’s Prisoner Grievance Appeal was also
denied. Thereafter, on October 6, 2009, Friedman filed a complaint with the
trial court.
At ¶
3.
In his due process claim, Friedman argues that the County’s policies and
practices violated his procedural due process rights by punishing him for
practicing his religion without “a hearing or other process.” In analyzing due
process, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, “At a minimum, [t]imely and
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are at the
very heart of procedural fairness.” In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876
(Utah 1996) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Friedman has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. He
has simply not “alleged enough in the complaint to state a cause of action” for
a due process violation in this instance. See Alvarez v. Galetka, 933
P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1997). The instruction to clean the writing off his cell
wall and the filing of the Prisoner Violation Report were both conducted in
accordance with the Detention Center’s rules and regulations. Although
Friedman’s recreation hour was terminated before the full process was
complete, Friedman has not met his burden of demonstrating that the
County denied him due process during the initial disciplinary action or in the
administrative review process that followed. In fact, Friedman was given a
disciplinary hearing just two days after the alleged grievance arose. Friedman
was also allowed to make a prisoner grievance appeal. Thus, we determine that
Friedman’s due process claim was properly dismissed.
At ¶¶
7-8.
. . . Friedman has failed to allege facts that would support a claim of
involuntary servitude. By his own admission, at the time of the officer’s
order, Friedman was detained at the Detention Center. Every inmate of that
facility is subject to its rules and regulations. The jail officer instructed
Friedman to clean off “some nondescript writing” from his cell wall. In so
doing, the officer was seeking to enforce the jail rule requiring inmates to clean
their cells on a daily basis. After Friedman refused, explaining that it was
his Sabbath, the officer penalized Friedman by discontinuing his recreation
hour pursuant to Detention Center rules and regulations.
Friedman’s allegations do not give rise to involuntary servitude because
Friedman essentially chose to disobey the officer’s order to clean the wall and
thereby have his recreation hour discontinued. He fails to allege any other
repercussion as a result of the officer’s Prisoner Violation Report. See
Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 459 (2d Cir. 1996) (“In
application, courts have consistently found the involuntary servitude standard
is not so rigorous as to prohibit all forms of labor that one person is
compelled to perform for the benefit of another. The Thirteenth Amendment [to
the United States Constitution5]
does not bar labor that an individual may, at least in some sense, choose not
to perform, even where the consequences of that choice are ‘exceedingly bad.’”
(citation omitted)). In addition, the facts alleged by Friedman do not support
a claim of “servitude” performed “for another,” as opposed to undertaking mere
housekeeping chores in his own cell. See McGarry v. Pallito, 687 F.3d
505, 514 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Where a detainee is required to perform
personally-related chores, this work is not for another. . . . [T]he Thirteenth
Amendment may be violated if a[n] . . . institution requires inmates to perform
chores which . . . are not personally related, but are
required to be performed solely in order to assist in the defraying of
institutional costs.” (alterations in original) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079, 1085 (4th
Cir. 1993) (determining that “[d]aily general housekeeping responsibilities”
did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of involuntary servitude)
At ¶¶
11-12.
We begin our analysis of this issue “in adherence to the general rule
that courts should avoid reaching constitutional issues if the case can be
decided on other grounds.” West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999,
1004 (Utah 1994). In this case, we need not address whether the free exercise
clause is self-executing because Friedman did not meet the pleading elements
under [Spackman ex rel. Spackman v. Board of Education, 2000 UT 87, 16
P.3d 533.]
At ¶
16.
. . .even assuming that he can meet the first two elements of Spackman,
he still failed to plead facts sufficient to allege the third element of Spackman—“that
equitable relief, such as an injunction [or declaratory judgment], was and is
wholly inadequate to protect [his] rights or redress his . . . injuries.”6 See Spackman, 2000 UT 87, ¶
25. “This final requirement is meant to take advantage of the meaningful role
equitable relief can play in redressing constitutional injuries, while not
implicating so many of the difficult policy considerations raised by a decision
to award damages.” Id. (footnote omitted).
At ¶
18.
Spencer Law Office v. Department of
Workforce Services, 2013 UT App 138, Case No. 20110915-CA (May 31, 2013).
ISSUE: Just
Cause for Termination of Employment
Judge Roth,
Spencer Law Office, LLC (Spencer) challenges the decision of the
Workforce Appeals Board (the Board) that a former employee (the Claimant) was
entitled to unemployment benefits because Spencer had not discharged him for
just cause. We decline to disturb the Board’s decision.
At ¶ 1.
Even if an employer has a legitimate reason for discharging an employee,
“not every legitimate cause for discharge justifies a denial of [unemployment]
benefits.” Utah Admin. Code R994-405-201. Rather, unemployment “[b]enefits will
be denied if [a] claimant was discharged for just cause.” Id. (providing
further that benefits may also be denied if the claimant was discharged “for an
act or omission in connection with employment . . . which was deliberate,
willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer’s rightful interest”). “To
establish just cause for a discharge , . . . three elements must be satisfied:”
culpability, knowledge, and control. Id. R994-405-202. Culpability is
established if “[t]he conduct causing the discharge [is] so serious that
continuing the employment relationship would jeopardize the employer’s rightful
interest.” Id. R994-405-202(1). Next, “[t]he claimant must have had knowledge
of the conduct expected” by the employer. Id. R994-405-202(2). And finally,
“[t]he conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant’s
control.” Id. R994-405-202(3)(a).
At ¶ 4.
On review,
the Board’s factual findings will be reversed only if they are not supported by
substantial evidence.
At ¶ 5.
Here, the Board found that the Claimant had been considering a job offer but had not yet decided to accept it and leave Spencer’s employment. The Board reasoned that the Claimant’s mere consideration of a job offer did not jeopardize Spencer’s “rightful interest” and therefore concluded that Spencer did not have just cause to discharge him. In challenging the Board’s decision, Spencer argues that the Board’s factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence and fail to accurately describe the Claimant’s conduct that led to his discharge. Spencer also argues that the Board’s application of the facts to the law in reaching its conclusion that Claimant was not discharged for just cause is not reasonable or rational. We address each of these arguments in turn.
At ¶ 6.
The Court reviews the evidence and determines that the Board’s factual finding was supported by substantial evidence.
At ¶¶ 8-13.
As support for his argument that the Claimant breached a duty of loyalty
by planning to leave for other competing employment, Spencer cites to Prince,
Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, 94 P.3d 179. There, the court
explained that “an agent[, such as an employee,] is subject to a duty not to
compete with the principal[, such as his employer,] concerning the subject
matter of his agency [or employment].” Id. ¶¶ 20–22 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Based on this rule, the court concluded
that, in particular, lawyers have an “obligation to not compete with their
employer,” which the court defined as “any law firm or legal service provider
who may employ them in a legal capacity, without the employer’s prior knowledge
and agreement.” Id. ¶ 23. Further, to support his contention that the
Claimant should have disclosed to him not only the job offer but also the
Attorney’s plans to leave and start a competing business, Spencer cites Rash
v. J.V. Intermediate, Ltd., 498 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2007), for the
proposition that an “employee has a duty to deal openly with the employer and
to fully disclose to the employer information about matters affecting the
company’s business.” Id. at 1210 (emphasis, citation, and internal
quotation marks omitted). The court in Rash also explained that
“[a]lthough an employee does not owe an absolute duty of loyalty to his or her
employer, at the very least, an employee’s independent enterprise cannot
compete or contract with the employer without the employer’s full knowledge.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Based on this authority,
Spencer concludes that the Claimant’s knowledge of or participation in a plan
to depart and start a competing business, whether or not it involved wrongful
conduct such as taking client lists or poaching clients while still employed,
violated the Claimant’s duty not to compete with Spencer and, therefore,
jeopardized Spencer’s “rightful interest,” giving him just cause to discharge
the Claimant.
At ¶ 16.
Spencer, however, presents an incomplete analysis of the case law upon
which he relies. In explaining the general concepts that Spencer uses to
support his argument, the court in Rash cites a case that more fully
explains an employee’s duty to disclose outside employment plans to his
employer, Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, PC, 73 S.W.3d 193 (Tex.
2002). See Rash, 498 F.3d at 1207–11. In Johnson, the court
explained that an employer-employee relationship “is . . . a special [agency]
relationship that gives rise to a fiduciary duty.” 73 S.W.3d at 200. The court
cautioned, however, that “courts . . . should be careful in defining the scope
of the fiduciary obligations an employee owes when acting as the employer’s
agent in the pursuit of business opportunities,” for although an employee
should not compete with the employer for whom he still works, the “employer’s
right to demand and receive loyalty must be tempered by society’s legitimate
interest in encouraging competition.” Id. at 201. The Johnson court
thus concluded that an “employee may properly plan to go into competition with
his employer and may take active steps to do so while still employed” and “has
no general duty to disclose his plans to his employer” and, further, that “he
may secretly join other employees in the endeavor without violating any duty to
his employer.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In
contrast, the court in Prince Yeates did not address what an employee
may do in preparing to leave while still acting according to the duty to not
compete with an employer. Rather, Prince Yeates involved circumstances
where the employee clearly competed with his employer while still employed. See
2004 UT 26, ¶¶ 7, 19, 24.
Thus, based on the line of authority that Spencer has relied on, his
arguments ultimately fail. Prince Yeates is inapplicable because it
addresses an employee’s duty to not compete with the employer while still
employed. Here, there is no evidence that the Claimant began competing with
Spencer while still employed; rather, he considered an offer from another
employee to leave Spencer’s employ and then enter into competition with
Spencer. Under Johnson, which seems to fit the circumstances of this
case better than Prince Yeates, the Claimant had “no general duty to
disclose his plans to his employer” and could plan to go into business with the
Attorney and compete with Spencer and could even “take active steps to do so
while still employed” “without violating any duty to his employer.” Id. (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Spencer’s claim that the Claimant
violated a fiduciary duty of loyalty by failing to disclose the Attorney’s
plans or by planning himself to leave with the Attorney to start a competing
practice therefore is not supported by the authority upon which Spencer relies.
As a consequence, Spencer cannot demonstrate that the Claimant’s conduct
“jeopardize[d his] rightful interest.” See Utah Admin. Code
R994-405-202(1). Thus, the Board’s determination was reasonable and rational.
At ¶¶
17-18.
Employer’s Reinsurance Fund v. Labor
Commission, 2013 UT App 139, Case No. 20130174-CA (May 31, 2013).
ISSUE:
Jurisdiction of an Agency’s Action.
Per Curiam,
Employers’
Reinsurance Fund (ERF) seeks judicial review of a decision of the Labor
Commission denying a motion to dismiss and remanding the case to an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for further proceedings. This case is before the
court on a sua sponte motion for summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
At ¶ 1.
An aggrieved party may seek judicial review of the “final agency action
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(1)
(LexisNexis 2011). “The Utah Administrative Procedures Act does not
specifically define ‘final agency action.’” Barker v. Utah Pub. Servs.
Comm’n, 970 P.2d 702, 705 (Utah 1998). However, “Utah cases on finality
found no final order in the following circumstances: . . . a remand for further
proceedings, Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463, 464 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), [and] a denial of a motion to dismiss, Barney v. Division of
Occupational & Prof’l Licensing, 828 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).” . . . “[t]he denial of a motion to dismiss allows the proceeding to
continue in the agency and is not a final order for purposes of judicial
review.” Id. at 544. Similarly, in Sloan v. Board of Review, 781
P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam), we concluded that “an order of [an]
agency is not final so long as it reserves something for the agency for further
decision.” Id. at 464.
At ¶ 3.
Because the denial of a motion to dismiss is not a final agency action,
we lack jurisdiction over ERF’s petition for review.
At ¶ 4.
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